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INTRODUCTION

Client autonomy' is commonly accepted as the cornerstone of the modem

attorney-client relationship. Over a century ago, when the American Bar
Association adopted the Canons of Professional Ethics, it stressed that "[t]he
lawyer owes 'entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability."'2 Though the Canons of Professional Ethics have since been
superseded, 3 their commitment to autonomy endures. An attorney is expected to
foster an environment that enables clients to achieve their goals and make
4
informed autonomous decisions throughout the representation. At the very
least, the attorney should not interfere with a client's decisions. The purpose of
representation is to assist clients in exercising their legal rights within the system
of law. 5 In doing so, it is assumed that an attorney increases a client's autonomy.

1.
The term client autonomy refers to individual autonomy. Autonomy, client autonomy,
and individual autonomy will all be used synonymously and interchangeably throughout this
Article. Individual, sometimes called personal, autonomy is not to be confused with moral
autonomy. Generally, autonomy has been divided into two categories: moral and individual. See
John Christman, Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (last updated Aug. 11, 2009), htp://plato.stanford.edulentries/autonomy-moral/ (citing
GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 35 (Sydney Shoemaker ed.,
1988); Thomas E. Hill Jr., The Kantian Conception of Autonomy, in THE INNER CITADEL: ESSAYS
OF INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY 91, 94 (John Christman ed., 1989). While the two are indirectly related,
moral autonomy, most profoundly developed and defined by the eighteenth century German
philosopher Immanuel Kant, is a doctrine concerning the nature of morality. JOSEPH RAZ, THE
MORALITY OF FREEDOM 370 n.2 (1986); see Jane Dryden, Autonomy: Overview, INTERNET
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (last updated Nov. 21, 2010), http://www.iep.utm.edulautonomy/.
Kant described moral autonomy as a fundamental organizing principle for morality; the capacity to
impose objective moral law on oneself. See Eric Wilson, Kantian Autonomy and the Moral Self 62
THE REV. OF METAPHYSICS 355, 376 (2008); see also Hill, supra, at 94 (discussing freedom as
"moral liberty" that one gives himself). Individual autonomy, by contrast, which is the sole focus of
this Article, is instead focused on the freedom a person has to govern and direct their own lives.
RAZ, supra, at 370 n.2. It is only one aspect or element of a moral doctrine. Id.
2.
ABA CANON OF PROF'L ETHICS, Canon 15 (1908). It goes on to say that only "the rules
of law, legally applied," place limitations on how far an attorney should go in pursuing a client's
interests. Id.
3.
ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, at vii (Ellen J. Bennett et al.
eds., 7th ed. 2011) (governing the rules regarding professional conduct and ethics).
4.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a), 2.1. (2011). Rule 1.2(a) reads, in
pertinent part, "A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of
representation and . . . shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued."
R. 1.2(a). The Rules establish a relationship in which the lawyer handles the means to
accomplishing the client's objectives. Id The Rules demand that the lawyer abides by the client's
decisions and informs the client about the means to carrying out those objectives. Id. At all times,
the lawyer serves as an advisor to the client regarding the client's ends and goals. R. 1.2(a), 2.1.
5. See infra Part ll.A.
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This account is especially potent in legal ethics when trying to reconcile a
lawyer's actions with ordinary moral considerations of right and wrong.6 It is no
hidden fact that sometimes clients use lawyers to achieve goals that a normal
person would view as immoral or wrong. In such circumstances, an attorney is
not only permitted, but is obligated, to carry out the goals of the client so long as
the goals are within the bounds of the law, even if the goals are morally
reprehensible. The moral clout of autonomy is far from miniscule. On the one
hand, devotion to client autonomy deprives an attorney from having a moral
agenda. On the other, it excuses the attorney from moral responsibility. In
either case, a quintessential and fundamental moral argument follows. Client

6.
The traditional, yet still widely held, ethical theory dealing with this central legal ethics
problem is called "the standard conception" or "dominant view." See generally TIM DARE,
COUNSEL OF ROGUES? A DEFENSE OF THE STANDARD CONCEPTION OF THE LAWYER'S ROLE

(2009) (discussing the standard conception and the modem role of the attorney). The standard
conception defends that attorneys have a very unique role, and it therefore restructures morality so
that it is properly suited to that role. W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW 29-

31 (2010). What is right and wrong for an attorney is not the same as a normal person. See id. Under
the standard conception, a lawyer lives by three principles: (1) the principle of partisanship, (2) the
principle of neutrality, and (3) the principle of nonaccountability. DARE, supra, at 11-12; see
Wendel, supra, at 29-31. A lawyer has the positive duty to exclusively promote a client's interest,
so long as it is lawful. DARE, supra, at 12. This duty shall not be interrupted by the lawyer's own
moral judgments. Id. The lawyer must place moral judgments aside and ensure they do not get in
the way of representation. Id. If there are legal means to achieving the client's goal, then it is
irrelevant whether or not the attorney finds the goals immoral. Id In fact, the attorney is obligated to
assist in the achieving of those goals. Id In representing a client, however, the attorney is not to be
judged for the immorality of the client's goals or the means used to obtain them. Id. Furthering the
client's interests is at the heart of the attorney's duty, but as a consequence, the attorney is insulated
from the morals involved. Id. Therefore, attorney morality is something different than the morality
of nonlawyers. Id.
7.
This assertion warrants some qualification. Bradley Wendel, for example, has identified
that many attorney actions, which raise moral problems, would never arise outside the context of
legal representation. See, e.g., id. at 29 (noting that it is almost impossible to conceive of a situation
in which an ordinary person would have the duty to ask embarrassing and invasive questions to a
complete stranger, as an attorney sometimes must do in a deposition).
8.
David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARv. L. REV. 468, 471 (1990)
(quoting MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980)). The boundary claim is a term
David Wilkins used to describe an attorney's responsibility to further his client's interests to the
extent that they are lawful. Wilkins, supra, at 471; see generally Rebecca Aviel, The Boundary
Claim's Caveat: Lawyers and Confidentiality Exceptionalism, 86 TUL. L. REV. 1055 (2012)
(exploring the significance of the boundary claim and whether attorneys are exempt from laws that
would require them to break client confidentiality). While an attorney has a duty to further a client's
interests, the attorney also has a duty to the administration of justice. Wilkins, supra, at 47 1. Since
an attorney must be loyal to the law, the boundary claim limits service provided to a client to that
which is within the law's boundaries. Id. Additionally, the Model Rules affirm this point. See
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT PMBL, ¶ 9 (2011) (declaring that a lawyer's obligation is to
"zealously protect and pursue a client's interests within the bounds of the law"); see also MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (prohibiting a lawyer from assisting a client to do something
criminal or fraudulent).
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autonomy is a foundational value that justifies an amoral role for attorneys.9
Because client autonomy is good, increasing it is good; therefore, the attorney is
justified in acting immorally, if on behalf of the client, in pursuin the client's
objectives because the attorney is increasing the client's autonomy. Under this
framework, client autonomy provides an answer to many of the most difficult
issues regarding lawyer morality." Treated as the very cornerstone of the
modem attorney-client relationship, it constitutes an essential element in legal
ethics dialogue. 2 However, a troubling matter has been overlooked.
Despite its magnitude, a systematic account of whether client autonomy
truly is a feature of the attorney-client relationship has never been established.
Instead, that attorneys enhance client autonomy, to a large extent, has been an
assumption comfortably and mistakenly taken for granted. By comfortably
accepting without question that autonomy is a function of the modem attorneyclient relationship, the many limitations an attorney has when it comes to
actually enhancing client autonomy have been overlooked. As this Article will
demonstrate, the extent to which client autonomy exists as a feature of the
attorney-client relationship is greatly overstated. The consequence is that the
value of client autonomy as a moral justification has been equally overstated.
This Article seeks to deflate the current aura surrounding client autonomy,
exposing its many limitations and demonstrating how it has been considerably
overstated. In the process, it hopes to ground the use of client autonomy by
accurately portraying the relatively minor role it plays in the actual attorneyclient relationship. From this grounded position, this Article seeks to establish
autonomy's proper role, not as a moral justification but as a component of
professionalism. To that end, Part I begins with a comprehensive understanding
of the meaning and value of autonomy, as it is understood within our legal
system. Part II.A identifies some of the legal scholarship centered upon client
autonomy and its moral significance. Part II.B follows with a detailed account
of the attorney-client relationship and identifies where client autonomy fits in.
Part III presents two problems, a conceptual problem and a transactional
problem, which reveal the many limitations an attorney faces in enhancing client
autonomy. Conceptually, an attorney is in no way capable of actually ensuring a
client will exercise autonomy. The attorney is confined only to helping secure
the preconditions that potentially set a client up to exercise autonomy. In a
transactional situation, when examined closely, an attorney largely fails to secure

9. See Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and
Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 617 (1986). Client autonomy has been the
token justification for the standard conception. See id Stephen Pepper argues that because attorneys
assist clients in gaining access to the law, they are increasing client autonomy. See id at 617; infra
Part II.A. Because autonomy is a good in itself, an amoral role not subject to normal, ordinary
morality for lawyers is justified. See Pepper,supra, at 617.
10. See generally Pepper, supra note 9, at 614 (asserting client autonomy is a moral
justification for the generally accepted amoral ethical role of the lawyer).
11. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYER'S ETHICS 48 (1990).
12. See infra Part II.A.
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even these preconditions and many times in ways the attorney is not aware.
Finally, Part IV discusses the implications these limitations have on legal ethics
and frames a different understanding for the role of autonomy in the attorneyclient relationship. This Article will argue that striving after client autonomy is
part of what it means to be a professional.
1I.

THE MEANING AND VALUE OF AUTONOMY

Although extensive scholarship has been dedicated to defining and
understanding individual autonomy, it is a concept that remains somewhat
vague.' 3 Political theorists and moral philosophers alike acknowledge autonomy
as something central to liberal theory and basic rights, but cannot agree on any
mutual definition.14 This has been attributed to the fact that autonomy is only a
metaphor, or a term of art,16 used in a variety of different contexts in which its
meaning and significance adapt accordingly. 17 Willard Gaylin and Bruce
Jennings, coauthors of the book The Perversion of Autonomy, advise that
"[a]utonomy is not a single idea but a cluster of closely related, over-lapping
ideas. Or to put it differently, there are various ways of seeing autonomy,
various guises in which it can reveal its moral meaning."' 8
One particular way of seeing autonomy, and the one pertinent here, is within
a political and legal framework that specifically addresses an individual's rights
protected by the legal system.1 9 Within this framework, all notions of individual
autonomy tend to find common ground on two fundamental points: (a) autonomy

13. THOMAS MAY, AUTONOMY, AUTHORITY, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 35 (1998); see
also EMILIO SANTORO, AUTONOMY, FREEDOM, AND RIGHTS: A CRITIQUE OF LIBERAL

SUBJECTIVITY 13 (2003).
14. SANTORO, supra note 13, at 13.
15.

Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, in THE INNER CITADEL: ESSAYS OF INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY

27, 27 (John Christman ed., 1989). Joel Feinberg comments that personal autonomy is familiar to us
because it was derived from the notion of the self-government or independence of states and
institutions. Id. In other words, its application to individuals was probably intended as a political
methphor. Id.
16. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 6. Gerald Dworkin suggests that autonomy lacks a core
meaning because it is a term of art introduced by a theorist in order to clarify or make sense of
tangled ideas, issues, and normative claims. Id. at 7.
17. See id. at 6-7.
18. WILLARD GAYLIN & BRUCE JENNINGS, THE PERVERSION OF AUTONOMY: THE PROPER
USES OF COERCION AND CONSTRAINTS IN A LIBERAL SOCIETY 32 (1996).

19. See Feinberg, supra note 15, at 46-49 (relating personal autonomy to sovereignty). One
sense of autonomy that Joel Feinberg suggests is autonomy as a right to self-sovereignty. Id.
Political discourse has also viewed autonomy as the fundamental idea supporting human rights. See
David A.J. Richards, Rights and Autonomy, in THE INNER CITADEL: ESSAYS OF INDIVIDUAL
AUTONOMY 203, 207 (John Christman ed., 1989). But see RAZ, supra note 1, at n.2 (conceding the
importance of autonomy but denying it is something to which individuals have a right); see also
Jeremy Waldron, Autonomy and Perfectionism in Raz's Morality of Freedom, 62 S. Cal. L. Rev.
1097, 1123-25 (1989) (citing RAZ, supra note 1, at 166, 247, 408, 412, 418, 423) (discussing
whether Raz believes that individuals have a right to autonomy).
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is a feature of persons, and (b) it is a desirable quality to have, 2 0 albeit
controversial just how desirable a quality it may be.21
A.

Autonomy is a FeatureofPersons

Autonomy is a feature of a person, including an artificial legal person such
as a corporation. 22 The etymology comes from the Greek words autos, meaning
"oneself," and nomos, meaning "law." 23 Quite literally, it means a self24
governing individual, someone who is self-sovereign.
To place this in the
political and legal context, autonomy is the right to be self-sovereign. 25 It is a
right which provides someone the authority to self-determine his or her own
26
life. A person who acts autonomously acts according to that individual's own
will.27 There is an inseparable association between someone's actions and
someone's will. 2 8 A person, and only that person, chooses certain and particular
29
ends.
The legal philosopher Joel Feinberg states it most succinctly, "I am
autonomous if I rule me and no one else rules I.,,30
Inherent to this
understanding of autonomy is the question of whether someone has the capacity
for it.

20. Gerald Dworkin, The Concept of Autonomy, in THE INNER CITADEL: ESSAYS OF
INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY 54, 55 (John Christman ed., 1989).
21. See David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client
Relationship: A Reply to Stephen Ellmann, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1004, 1037 (1990) (arguing that
autonomy has no intrinsic value). Autonomy, by some accounts, has no value on its own. Id.
Instead, it is merely a precondition for, when exercised responsibly, other things of great value. Id.
Autonomy's importance is derived from the other values it is intimately connected to. Id. This issue
will be discussed at greater length below.
22. At least one court has considered corporations to be artificial legal entities, or persons, for
the purposes of the law. See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636
(1819). More specifically, Courts have recognized that the law affords and protects certain rights
and privileges, and that if the right exists, it also extends to individuals, corporations, and entities
alike. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (extending free
speech rights to corporations); see also First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784
(1978) (holding that speech does not lose protection merely because it was made by a corporation).
Based upon this reasoning, individual autonomy extends to corporations.
23.

GAYLIN & JENNINGS, supra note 18, at 30.

24. Id
25. See Sharon Hill, Self-Determination and Autonomy, in TODAY'S MORAL PROBLEMS 171,
176 (Richard Wasserstrom ed., 1975) (drawing parallels between one self-determining one's own
life, and the actions of sovereign states).
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. Id.
30.

Joel Feinberg, The Idea of a Free Man, in RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF

LIBERTY 3, 21 (1980). Of course, one can choose to be ruled and subject to a system of law, and by
doing so one is choosing to act in a way consistent with those laws.
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Granting an individual the right to be autonomous is not necessarily ensuring
that the person is autonomous.
This is because a person must first have the
capacity to act autonomously.32 It is undisputed that while autonomy is a feature
of persons, it is not a feature every person has. 33 To borrow language from the
moral and political philosopher Joseph Raz, there is a primary sense and a
secondary sense of autonomy. 34 The primary sense of autonomy refers to
achieving the autonomous life, while the secondary sense of autonomy concerns
the capacity for autonomy or the preconditions that are first necessary before a
person can achieve the autonomous life.35
1.

The PrimarySense ofAutonomy

The primary sense of autonomy is its achievement.36 When someone
chooses to act in a way that is consistent with both the individual's own will and
self-determined goals, that person achieves the autonomous life.
The
autonomous individual discovers projects, goals, and pursuits and chases after
them. 38 Autonomous persons decide which relationships to develop, building
their own personally constructed society. 39
Such a person realizes and
understands that there are many options in life to choose from, and thoughtfully
chooses options in an attempt to accomplish a particular goal or avoid future
consequences. 40
Achieving autonomy involves a deep reflection on personal wishes and
preferences, and includes having the freedom to choose which ones to follow
and which to abandon. 4 1 Gerald Dworkin describes achieving autonomy as the
second order capacity to critically reflect on your first order desires and either
adopt or attempt to change them.42 Achieving autonomy for Dworkin is
recognizing that "I want to buy a new car," and then critically reflecting on
whether I will or will not buy a new car based upon the future benefits and
consequences. As long as I understand that the choice to buy a new car that
choice has its own consequences and benefits, and I act to that understanding, I
have enjoyed the autonomous life.
A more meaningful example might be the choice between joining the army
and starting a business. The autonomous man may do either, so long as there are

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Hill, supra note 25, at 176.
See Feinberg,supra note 30, at 28.
See id.
RAZ, supra note 1, at 204.
Id
Id.
Id
See id. at 154-55.
See id.
See id.
See DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 20.
Id
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reasons behind adopting one pursuit at the expense of rejecting the other.
Achieving autonomy is havin freedom in one's choices and knowing the
reasons for living one's life.
"By exercising such a capacity," Dworkin
comments, "persons define their nature, give meaning and coherence to their
lives, and take responsibility for the kind of person they are."" Raz phrases it in
the following manner:
[A]utonomous persons are those who can shape their life and
determine its course. They are not merely recreational agents who can
choose between options after evaluating relevant information, but agents
who can in addition adopt personal projects, develop relationships, and
accept commitments to causes, through which their personal integrity
and sense of dignity and self-respect are made concrete.45
An important aspect to be drawn from this depiction of autonomy is that it is
an internal achievement. It is an achievement that happens within the person.
The autonomous life is not discerned by looking at what a particular action is,
but instead by looking at why that action came to be.46 Autonomy does not
depend upon either the success or completion of a particular goal or project but
rather upon the underlying reasoning for its pursuit.47

In choosing to start a

business instead of joining the army, a person acts autonomously so long as the
person has reasons for doing so. If a person starts a business after contemplating
whether the desire to do so is one worth adopting, the person is autonomous. It
is of no matter whether the business succeeds or fails, but simply that the person
chose to pursue it. An autonomous life need not be accompanied by any
48
measure of what may be considered objective success. In determining whether
a person is autonomous, one must only consider why that person's life has turned
out the way it has.49 The primary sense of autonomy, however, can only be
achieved if a person first has the capacity to achieve it.50 An individual must
possess certain abilities before the individual is able to choose one life over
52
another.5 1 This capacity refers to the secondary sense of autonomy.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See id.
Id.
RAZ, supra note 1, at 154.
Id. at 371.
See id
See id.
See id.
See id at 372.
Id
Id
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The Secondary Sense ofAutonomy

The secondary sense of autonomy is deeply rich and complex. It concerns
the preconditions that are first necessary before a person can achieve
autonomy.53 The secondary sense of autonomy recognizes the state of the
individual-mental and physical-and that the circumstances of the individual's
life are intricately related to that person's ability to act autonomously. 54 As
identified by Raz, a person possessing the preconditions for autonomy has the
appropriate mental abilities, independence, and an adequate range of options.5 5
Of course, these conditions can, and often do, interact.
a.

The AppropriateMental Abilities

The achievement of autonomy requires that an individual have the
appropriate mental abilities. 5 6 Intrinsic to bein self-governing is the belief that
the self-governing is conducted by the true self. To use an illustration, persons
who are victims to their addictions to heavy substances do not have the mental
capacity to exercise autonomy. As the novelist and public defender Sergio de la
Pava playfully notes, "First you take the drugs then the drugs take the drugs and
then the drugs take you."58 A person driven by an addiction, incapable of acting
in a manner inconsistent with that addiction, is not the true self.59 If an
individual is incapable of making decisions that reflect the true self,
representative of any true desires and goals, then that person does not have the
appropriate mental capacity for autonomy. 60
This is also true of the person who is psychologically disabled.6
An
autonomous life implies the use of the underlying human quality of

5 3. Id.
54. See id.
55. Id While Gaylin and Jennings also agree on these conditions for autonomy, they use
different language. Gaylin and Jennings call the prerequisites for autonomy: (1) independence, (2)
self-mastery, (3) detached rationality, and (4) negative liberty. GAYLIN & JENNINGS, supra note 18,
at 37-51. Still, the concepts are indistinguishable. Joel Feinberg also embraces somewhat similar
concepts, detailing four different meanings of autonomy, but not making the distinction between a
secondary and primary sense of autonomy. See Feinberg, supra note 15, at 28-49 (characterizing
four different meanings of autonomy: (1) the capacity to govern oneself, (2) the actual condition of
self-government, (3) the ideal of autonomy, and (4) the rights expressive of self-sovereignty).
56. RAZ, supra note 1, at 372.
57. See GAYLIN & JENNINGS, supra note 18, at 37-38; see also Hill, supra note 25, at 179
(discussing that a person's right of self-determination creates a presumption that the person should
act decisively to the individual's own interests).
58.

SERGIO DE LA PAVA, A NAKED SINGULARITY 94 (2012).

59. See GAYLIN & JENNINGS, supra note 18, at 9 (discussing how a crack addict is not a free
human being even though voluntarily choosing to become a user).
60. See RAZ, supra note 1, at 3 72-73.
61. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14. The law is careful to recognize that a
person with diminished capacity, or one with a psychological disability, is limited in making
decisions and choices that are true to the self. See id (permitting a lawyer to seek the help of a
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rationality.62 The ability to rationalize, to make decisions not wholly dependent
on emotion or feeling and to use reason as an explanation and driving force, is a
natural right humans have.63 It provides the basis for autonomy.64 Not
surprisingly, the person who cannot rationalize, the person whose rational
functions are prohibited because of mental disability or otherwise, is not able to
achieve autonomy. 65
Rationality also requires psychological maturity.
It is not enough that a
person has the potential for mental capacity. Buried within the qualitative
67
component of autonomy is the assumption that the true self, when acting
autonomously, will serve its own current or future interests.68 One may not have
the psychological strengths to act and make choices consistent with one's own
interests. 69 There is a developmental aspect to ensuring that an individual has
the appropriate mental ability to achieve autonomy. 70 This includes biological
and intellectual development, two distinct concepts. 1 Biologically, a child may
not be able to be autonomous, regardless of whether that child is healthy and
72
intelligent.
A vivid appreciation of the range of enjoyments autonomy can
offer takes maturity and wisdom-maturity and wisdom that an adolescent may

guardian or take other protective action when it is reasonable to believe the client's mental capacity
prevents the client from making decisions within the client's best interest).
62. See Wilson, supra note 1, at 357. Kant formulated his views of moral autonomy on the
precept that the ability to rationalize was the natural right of humans. See id. Therefore, rationality
provided the very basis for a form of objective morality; the individual imposed objective moral
norms, founded in reason, upon himself. See id.
63. See id
64. See id
65. See id
66. See GAYLIN & JENNINGS, supra note 18, at 38; see also Hill, supra note 25, at 181
(discussing how guidance must be given to children because they do not have the requisite
psychological maturity).
67. The quality of autonomy will be discussed at length below, but it is important to
reference it here as it corresponds to and develops other related points.
68. See Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism,56 THE MONIST 64, 76 (1972) (referring to children's
conception of their present and future interests). A person can act in a way that is seemingly not in
that individual's best current interests for the sake of that future person's interests. See id. at 77. A
classic example is drawn from The Odyssey. Id Odysseus asked his men to tie him down and refuse
all future requests to set him free until after their ship passed by the Sirens. Id. Odysseus did not
want to be overcome by the enchanting power of the Siiens and fall prey to their lure. See id.
69. Hill, supra note 25, at 185.
70.

GAYLIN & JENNINGS, supra note 18, at 38.

71. Id; see also Hill, supra note 25, at 185 (discussing how a child may eventually become
autonomous through the physical and mental maturation process).
72. See GAYLIN & JENNINGS, supra note 18, at 37-38 (asserting that children are dependent
when they are first born and as such are not autonomous).
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not and debatably cannot have.
It is no coincidence that children provide an
apt analogy for the justification of paternalism. 74
Intellectually, much the same, an adult individual may not be capable of
acting consistent with the adult's own interests due to a lack of knowledge and
understanding.
To use an example as ridiculous as it is precise, the caveman
who does not know fire will bum the caveman may choose to touch a torch, even
though it would be in the caveman's best interest to refrain from doing so.
b.

Independence: Positive andNegative Liberty

In addition to the appropriate mental abilities, another precondition to the
achievement of autonomy is independence. 76 At the outset, it is important to
realize that no person can be fully independent.77 The poet John Donne once
wrote that no man is an island. 78 Every man, instead, is a piece of the
continent.79 One can never fully escape one's social and biological influences.80
It follows that an autonomous person is only part author of one's life, and
autonomy is rather seen as an ideal that is accomplished or achieved to a
degree.
It is not the case that someone is wholly non-autonomous or wholly
autonomous.82 In fact, such an ideal is impossible.83 Independence concerns to
what degree a person acts autonomously.
In other words, independence is 85a
sliding scale directly correlated to the degree of autonomy a person achieves.

73. See Hill, supra note 25, at 185 (asserting that children do not have the capacity to become
autonomous until they mature).
74. See Dworkin, supra note 68, at 76. Few deny that children cannot be autonomous until a
fully mature age, and parents, for the purposes of ensuring that their children grow up to make
rational, informed choices in their best interests, are not only permitted but expected to act
paternalistically to prevent, apart from other purposes, a child from committing self-harm. See id.
Consistent with this rationale is the argument that there are adults lacking the necessary
psychological strengths to make decisions in their best interests. See id. At the very least, it is
reasonable to conclude that a person ought to be prevented from causing harm to himself. See
Gerald Dworkin, Moral Paternalism,24 LAW AND PHIL. 305, 310 (2004); see also Dworkin, supra
note 68, at 76 (asserting that children do not possess the traits to know what is in their best interest).
The law also concedes this point. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
75. See RAZ, supra note 1, at 373.
76. Id. at 378.
77. See RAZ, supra note 1, at 155; see also MARTHA A. FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH:
A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 28 (2004) (arguing not only that full independence is impossible, it is
actually undesirable because we need social and economic relationships to sustain us).
78. John Donne, Meditation XVII (1624) in DEVOTIONS UPON EMERGENT OCCASIONS 86, 87
(Anthony Raspa ed., McGill-Queen's Univ. Press 1975) (1624).
79. Id.
80.

GAYLIN & JENNINGS, supra note 18, at 38.

81. RAZ, supra note 1, at 156.
82. See id
83. Id at 155.
84. Id. at 156.
85. See id
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The person achieving a high degree of autonon is highly independent. 8 6
Independence involves positive and negative liberty.
The discussion of positive liberty is similar, and runs parallel, to possessing
the appropriate mental abilities. It is the capacity to be in charge of one's own
conduct.8 It is the wish of the individual to be his own master, to create a life
and make decisions that depend on oneself and not on external forces.89 As
mentioned above, this partly includes being free from addiction and mental
obstacles. It also includes the circumstances surrounding a person's life.
Raz notes, "The more one's choices are dictated by personal needs, the less
autonomous one becomes." 90 If a father desires to become a full-time artist but
cannot afford to provide for his family unless he works two jobs that prohibit
him from working on his art, his life circumstances lessen his independence and
Victor Hugo's character in Les
thus his ability to live autonomously.
Miserables, Fantine, becomes a prostitute in order to provide for her daughter,
Cosette.91 Although Fantine made the decision to enter into prostitution, she was
not exercising autonomy.92 Fantine's choice depended not on herself, but on the
needs of her daughter, as well as on the surrounding circumstances of her life.93
The second aspect to independence is negative liberty. 94 Negative liberty is
being free from constraint. Berlin describes it as "warding off interference." 95
Negative liberty is the protection against intruders, or individuals that infringe
upon a person's independence. 96 Whereas positive liberty is associated with
self-control, negative liberty is the absence of control by others. 9 7 This is not
only confined to the protection of rights under the legal system. It also involves
being free of coercion and manipulation. 9 8
Coercion diminishes independence, and thereby autonomy, by reducing a
person's options. 99 It subjects a person, in a similar fashion to the examples
mentioned above, to act in a way that is not according to that person's own
will.100 Independence is replaced by the necessity to comply with another's
A person cannot
demands with the hope of avoiding a horrible consequence.

86.
87.

88.

See id
GAYLIN & JENNINGS, supra note 18, at 44.
Id. at 46.

89.

ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts ofLiberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 131 (1969).

90. RAZ, supra note 1, at 155.
91. See generally VICTOR HUGO, LES MIStRABLES (Charles E. Wilbour trans., 1992)
(portraying Fantine working as a prostitute for the sole purpose of providing for her child).
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. GAYLIN & JENNINGS, supra note 18, at 44.
95. BERLIN, supra note 89, at 127.
96.

GAYLIN & JENNINGS, supra note 18, at 44.

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id at 45.
RAZ, supra note 1, at 377.
Id
Id. at 378.
Id. at 377.
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exercise a significant degree of autonomy under coercion.102
Likewise,
manipulation invades autonomy.' 0 3 It does not interfere with someone's options
as coercion does, but distorts and perverts the way in which a person reaches
decisions.1 04 It robs a person's goals and pursuits, eliminating the independence
of self-determination and confusing the reasoning behind a person's choices. 05
c.

An Adequate Range of Options

Finally, the secondary sense of autonomy requires an adequate range of
options.
Raz gives two examples to illustrate this point.107 The first example
is of a man who falls into a pit. 8 Within the pit, the man has enough food and
water to keep him alive without suffering.1 09 He is unable to climb out or call
for help, and there is very little room for him to move. 110 His options are
confined to whether he will sleep now or later, or eat now or later. 1 Raz's
second example involves a woman on a desert island.'' 2 On the island she is
confronted with a beast who unceasingly hunts her.' 1 All of her emotional,
physical, and psychological faculties are dedicated to survival.114 Her actions are
limited by the one superseding goal of remaining alive." 5
Neither the man nor the woman is autonomous.l16 Each case presents a
failure in the adequacy of choice." 7 Once again, this aspect of the condition of
autonomy is connected with the above aspects. A person has the capacity for
autonomy only when there are a variety of adequate options.
There must be a
choice between several good options.11 9 It is not enough that there is one good

102. An objection may be raised here. Suppose John is held at gunpoint. The gunman says,
"Give me your wallet or I'll shoot you in the head." Technically, John could resist the gunman and
not be coerced into giving him his wallet. This is an autonomous act. Under the framework of
negative liberty, John, though being threatened, is still free from the control of the gunman if he
resists. See id. at 153 n. 1. However, it is important to keep in perspective the other components of
autonomy. John is all of a sudden faced with two options, both distasteful, and both that he would
not have freely chosen as an autonomous individual.
103. Id. at 378.
104. Id at 377.
105. Id. at 378.
106. Id. at 373.
107. Id at 373-74.
108. Id
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id at 374.
112. Id
113. Id
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 374-75.
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option and one bad option, and it is not adequate to have a choice between bad
options.120 A man being held at gunpoint, choosing between losing his wallet or
his life, is not presented with options that allow him to enjoy autonomy.121
Furthermore, a variety within the options is more important than having a large
number of similar options.122 For example, a choice between hundreds of
identical suburban homes is not as meaningful as the choice between a suburban
home and an urban flat. 123 Finally, the options must carry meaning or
significance in allowing a person to pursue a personal goal, project, or
relationship.124 The autonomous person understands the meaning of one's
choices, and perceives how choosing one option over another will have an
impact on any goals. 125
The woman on the island, though she has a variety of options, some of
which are likely good, does not have the ability to add significance or meaning
to the options she chooses. Her goals and projects are subverted by her need to
survive. There is no prospect for the self-realization of her goals.126 Without
goals, there is no meaning to her choices.
She cannot choose to be
unimaginative or out of shape.127 She is not the author of her own life, but
instead a character in a life thrust upon her.
The man and the woman above represent extreme examples. Ordinarily,
individuals enjoy an adequate range of options in at least some aspects of their
lives.128 In other aspects of life, however, an adequate range of options is
unavailable. 129 In such circumstances, a person may not be capable of exercising
autonomy.130 This does not mean that person no longer leads an autonomous
life.13 1 As previously noted, autonomy is exercised and experienced to a
degree. 132 A person does not suddenly become wholly nonautonomous. 133
When a person faces a situation lacking an adequate range of options, that
person's ability to act autonomously is affected only in relation to that particular

120. Id. at 153.
121. The choice between giving his wallet to the criminal now or later is not an exercise in
autonomy. Id.
122. Id. at 375.
123. Id. at 375. Gerald Dworkin also discusses, at length, the question of whether "More
Choice is Better Than Less." Dworkin concludes that, for the most part, people prefer more choices,
but there are situations, such as the choice between several identical suburban homes, in which it is
completely rational to prefer fewer options. Dworkin, supra note 16, at 62-81.
124. RAZ, supranote 1, at 377.
125. Id at 389-90.
126. Id at 375-76.
127. Id at 376.
128. See DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 14.
129. RAZ, supranote 1, at 373.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 156.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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circumstance.1 34 In other words, the particular circumstance does not contribute
to the person's autonomous life. Rather, it detracts from it.
B. Autonomy is a DesirableQuality to Have
Because autonomy has value, it is a desirable quality to have.'3 5 As might
be suspected, the value of autonomy is as multilayered as its definition. The
difficulty lies in the fact that autonomy is seemingly neutral.1 3 6 It is an empty
feature, or freedom, waiting to be filled up with choices.' 37 Since autonomy is
the construction of meaning for a person's life, what makes an individual the
particular person that this person is, autonomy is a "relatively contentless
notion."l 38 This is, of course, because there are innumerable ways to give shape
or meaning to one's life, none of which are necessarily better than the other.
There is no denying that certain lives are more admirable than others, but
autonomy assumes and respects that persons choose their own values, assigning
more or less worth to personal projects, regardless of whether they are publicly
admirable.1 40 Perhaps, it is this very nature of autonomy, neutral and detached,
that makes it so desirable.
Much of the modem relevance of autonomy was born of the political
revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.141 The American
colonies sought to overthrow absolute monarchies and replace them with
establishments based upon the consent of the governed.142 The shift in political
theory came to focus on the individual, possessive of certain natural rights, and a
government that ensured and protected those rights.143 Liberal democracy saw
autonomy as an ideal, and it structured a government and legal system that best
accomplished that ideal.144 The modern system of government is one of
liberty. 45 Persons choose to live in accordance with rules that they assign
themselves, or rules that they choose to abide by.146 By doing so, persons
consent
to a moral doctrine experienced on the individual, social, and political
47
level.

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

See id. at 373.
Dworkin, supra note 21, at 55.
GAYLIN & JENNINGS, supra note 18, at 39-40.
Id.
DWORKIN, supra note 1, at I10.

139. Id.

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
GAYLIN & JENNINGS, supra note 18, at 35.
Id. at 36.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 37.

147. See id.
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For these reasons, valuing autonomy can lead to a form of moral
pluralism.148 In other words, valuing autonomy, in and of itself, means that one
must value a range of options that may or may not be morally compatible.1 49
Such a view is only consistent with moral pluralism. so This is because, under
this view, autonomy is morally good despite whether the autonomous person
chooses good or evil.151 At the very least, autonomy acknowledges that moral
values are not the same and reserves to a person the right to choose one over
another.1 52 Bradley Wendel has identified that there are a wide range of
meaningful moral options to choose from in our liberal system. 53
In
recognizing that, one also must recognize the value of autonomously choosing
them. When viewed in this light, autonomy could be said to have intrinsic value.
There is reason to believe that autonomy is intrinsically valuable.1 54
Something has intrinsic value when it is good for its own sake.' 55 Autonomy
means exercising self-determination, and being recognized as an individual who
makes and determines one's own destiny.' 5 6 This enables a person to form selfrespect by gaining the respect of others.157 Because it is closely linked to many
desirable qualities unique to human potential-like creativity, risk-taking,
formulating and adhering to principles, and responsibility-autonomy is good in
and of itself.1s In one regard, it is intrinsically valuable because it is a quality of
humans, and a feature that furnishes human dignity and respect for each other
and ourselves.1 59

This notion, that autonomy is intrinsically valuable, however, is far from
universal. Many philosophers believe that autonomy has no intrinsic value.,so
Raz gives special attention to limiting the ideal of autonomy to morally
acceptable decisions.161 He presents the question of whether it is morally
preferable to let people autonomously choose wrong or be forced into choosing

148. See RAZ, supra note 1, at 398.
149. See id at 395-98.
150. Id. at 398.
151. See id. 398-99.
152. See W. Bradley Wendel, Moral Judgment and ProfessionalLegitimation, 51 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 1071, 1082 (2007) (quoting RAZ, supra note 1, at 378).
153. See id. (citing RAZ, supra note 1, at 378, 398).
154. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 111.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 112.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See Luban, supra note 21, at 1037. It has been theorized that autonomy has no standard
for the conception of the good. Autonomy is therefore only an instrument leading to values such as
liberty and equality. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (arguing for the
principled reconciliation of liberty and equality); see also Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE MORALITY 113 (Stuart Hampshire ed., 1978) (regarding Dworkin's theory on
liberalism).
161. RAZ, supranote 1, at 380.
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right.162 Using the reasoning that it is morally worse for someone to choose evil
on his own accord than be coerced into evil, the latter may be concluded.1 63
Those who disagree that autonomy has intrinsic value assign to it an
instrumental one.164 Something is instrumentally valuable because it leads to
other good things.165 Autonomy has instrumental value because it is probable
that it leads to good results and individuals take pleasure in the process.' 66
People will gain more satisfaction out of their lives if they shape it themselves,
partly because, if for no other reason, people are generally best situated to act
according to their own interests.1 67 Furthermore, there is something satisfying
and pleasing about determining one's life and reflecting and choosing among
preferences. 168
Despite the controversy surrounding the value and quality of autonomy,
there is no doubt that it is valuable, in a more or less degree. 69 This is especially
true in the American legal system. 170 The American legal system strives to
provide autonomy to individuals by protecting them from the interference of
others, and equipping them with means to pursue projects and accomplish
goals. 7 1 That each person understands autonomy as a desirable quality to have

162. "The question is, has autonomy any value qua autonomy when it is abused? Is the
autonomous wrongdoer a morally better person than the non-autonomous wrongdoer?" Id.
Intuitively, Raz argues it is clearly worse to autonomously choose wrong. Id
163. Raz casts a darker shadow on the autonomous wrongdoer than on the person who
momentarily, without exercising true autonomy, succumbs to doing wrong. "Demeaning, or narrowminded, or ungenerous, or insensitive behavior is worse when autonomously chosen and indulged
in." Id. Following this reasoning, and taking into consideration other moral values, when autonomy
is used for evil, coercing someone to choose right is almost certainly morally preferable and likely
morally justified. See generally id. (discussing the coercive effect of moral values). It should be
noted that the discussion of whether autonomy should be limited or infringed upon to promote other
moral values is deeply controversial and highly dichotomized. One common area of discourse is
whether criminal sanctions, ones seriously limiting autonomy, are validated by their attempt to
control immoral behavior. While this topic will not be addressed here, there are thoughtful
arguments on either side. See, e.g., Lawrence C. Becker, Crimes Against Autonomy: Gerald
Dworkin on the Enforcement of Morality, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 959 (1999) (citing DWORKIN,
supra note 1, at 20) (explaining that "liberal political theorists plausibly invoke autonomy to explain
why they draw the line about criminalization where they do").
164. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 111.

165. Id.
166. Id at 112.
167. Of course, there is plenty of scholarship debating the truth of this claim. It is, however, as
a generalization, highly probable. See id
168. Id
169. Autonomy is considered a core value in American public and private law. It constitutes a
"normative ingredient" for American democracy and develops a systematic theory connecting
American Constitutional law to moral and political conceptions of self-governing agents. See David
A. J. Richards, Autonomy in Law, in THE INNER CITADEL: ESSAYS OF INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY 246

(John Christman ed., 1989).
170. Id
171. Id. at 252.
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is fundamental to the way citizens treat each other in a liberal democracy. 72if
people value autonomy, then they value that there are many ways in which a
person will define meaning in life, many endeavors in which a person can choose
to engage in, many goals in which a person can seek to accomplish, and many
relationships a person can choose to appreciate.173 If people acknowledge this,
then they give weight to how a person defines meaning in choosing how they
personally act.1 74 Mutual respect for autonomy leads to mutual respect for each
other.17 5
III. CLIENT AUTONOMY AND THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP

A.

The Autonomy Assumption

The attorney-client relationship is often characterized as an agency
relationship, in which the client is the principal responsible for determining the
goals and objectives of the representation, and the attorney is the agent
facilitating and assisting the client in obtaining the client's goals. 176 Many
recognize client autonomy as the cornerstone of this agency relationship. 17 7 In
Charles Fried's classic article, in which he likens the attorney-client relationship
to a friendship, he states that the lawyer "acts in [the client's] interests, not his
Fried's analogy
own; or rather he adopts [the client's] interests as his own."

172. See DwORKIN, supra note 1, at 112; see also R. Dworkin, supra note 160, at 113
(explaining Dworkin's theory on liberalism).
173. See DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 30-31.
174. Id. at 32.
175. See id.
176. Eli Wald, Taking Attorney-Client Communications (and Therefore Clients) Seriously, 42
U.S.F. L. REV. 747, 751 (2008) (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a), (b) (2008)
(amended 2014)); Abe Fortas, Thurman Arnold and the Theatre of Law, 79 YALE L.J. 988, 1002
(1970).
177. See Wald, supra note 176, at 751.
178. Charles Fried, The Lawyer As Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client
Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1071 (1976). Fried's analogy is far from universally accepted.
William Simon has pointed out that the attorney-client relationship might better resemble
prostitution than friendship. William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: ProceduralJustice and
Professional Ethics, 1978 WiS. L. REV. 29, 108 (1978) (citing Fried, supra, at 1075). There have
been a number of other responses, most of which are critical. See, e.g., Camille A. Gear, The
Ideology of Domination: Barriers to Client Autonomy in Legal Ethics Scholarship, 107 YALE L.J.
2473, 2490-94 (1998) (citations omitted) (claiming this model actually decreases autonomy because
an attorney only chooses clients that share similar moral goals); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond
Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1239, 1239
(1993) (arguing that public defenders should value both empathy and heroism); Michael K.
McChrystal, Lawyers and Loyalty, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 367, 367 (1992) (considering the
nature of a lawyer's obligation to be loyal); Sanford Levinson, Testimonial Privileges and the
Preferences ofFriendship, 1984 DUKE L.J. 631, 631 (1984) (distinguishing two difficulties in the
law of testimonial privilege); Edward A. Dauer & Arthur A. Leff, Correspondence:The Lawyer as
Friend, 86 YALE L.J. 573, 573 (1977) (noting several significant gaps in the analogy between a
friend and a lawyer).
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to friendship establishes a relationship in which the attorney finds a client with
matching moral goals, to a certain extent, and carries on a moral dialogue with
that client.' 79 In the process, the attorney gives special attention to the
subjectivity of his client, adopts the client's interests as his own, and ultimately
"helps to preserve and express his client's autonomy" in relation to the legal
180
Similarly, Sylvia Law has argued that attorneys serve clients, enhance
system.
their individual autonomy and self-control, and encourage clients to know and
control their options and lives.s Law maintains that attorneys have the special
ability to enhance the autonomy and self-control of their clients.182 Finally,
Stephen Pepper, in his classic thought-provoking essay, argues that autonomy
serves as the root justification for an amoral ethical role for attorneys.183 Pepper
defends attorney amorality on the principle that law is dedicated to protecting
and increasing autonomy, and attorneys are the means by which an individual
accesses the law, discovers its benefits of autonomy, and is assisted in exercising
those benefits. 184 Pepper's argument is structured on the following three
premises: (1) the law is intended to be a public good which increases autonomy;
(2) increasing individual autonomy is morally good; and (3) in a highly legalized
society such as ours, autonomy is often dependent upon access to the law.1 5
Attorneys have the special role of providing access to the law. 186 Attorneys
also have specialized skill and knowledge, which enables them to assist
individuals in executing their goals within the legal system.
In doing so,
attorneys are increasing individual autonomy and providing a societal good. As
Webb pronounces it, "lawyers are an essential corollary to any meaningful self-

179. See Gear, supra note 178, at 2490-94.
180. See Fried, supra note 178, at 1074.
18 1. Sylvia A. Law, Afterword: The Purposes of ProfessionalEducation, in LOOKING AT LAW
SCHOOL 205, 212-13 (Stephen Gillers ed., 1977).
182. Id.
183. Pepper, supra note 9, at 613.
184. Id. at 617.
185. Id. at 615-19. Pepper, too, has had his share of responses. Andrew Kaufman comments
that when amorality is defended by playing up autonomy and equality, it is one thing, but when it is
defended by playing down what is generally agreed upon to be immoral, though not unlawful, it is
quite another. See Andrew L. Kaufman, A Commentary on Pepper, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
651 (1986). In other words, it is appropriate for the attorney to refuse an amoral role in a significant
number of cases. Id. David Luban also objects to Pepper's theory, but on the grounds that Pepper
mistakenly overvalues individual autonomy. See David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A
Response to Stephen Pepper, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 637 (1986). Luban denies that increasing
individual autonomy is to be preferred over right or good conduct. Id While it is desirable for
individuals to act autonomously, Luban argues that not all autonomous acts are desirable. Id.
Wendel has also listed some of the most frequent objections to using autonomy as a justification:
"clients are entitled only to a just measure of autonomy, autonomously chosen ends are valuable
only if the ends themselves are valuable, and even if autonomy has some positive value, helping
someone exercise autonomy to do something bad is not turned into a morally praiseworthy act by
the presence of the positive value of autonomy." Wendel, supra note 152, at 1081-82.
186. See Pepper, supra note 9, at 617.
187. See id at 615.
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The lawyer's function is to ensure, in a neutral way, that a
determination."'
client is afforded all the liberties the law provides.' 8 9 Monroe Freedman adds
that the law exists to protect a client's autonomy, and without the help of an
attorney, an ordinary person cannot exercise the autonomy in which the system
of law entitles that individual.1 90 Therefore, a lawyer's commitment is first and
foremost to the client's autonomy. 191 Lawyers have the unique task of being
neutral legal helpers that assist citizens in gaining access to the law.
Freedman suggests that for a lawyer to act professionally, and even morally, the
lawyer must maximize his client's autonomy and advise clients of all of their
legal rights.1 93 Doing anything less would be depriving the clients of their
autonomy. 194
The missing component in each of these is a comprehensive understanding
of autonomy, and a close examination of what enhancing it entails. Law merely
assumes, given the special role of attorneys, that the client's autonomy is being
increased. 95 In the same vein, along with being criticized for a variety of other
limitations,' 9 6 Fried's "friend" model equates pursuing the subjective interests of
a client with expressing or enhancing the client's autonomy,' 97 which fails to
address the complex and demanding nature of autonomy. Pepper also lends
more attention to why autonomy is a foundational value that justifies amorality,
than if indeed an attorney enhances it.' 98 These arguments represent the
common trend of the legal profession to overlook the extensive and demanding
nature of autonomy.
That autonomy serves as the very cornerstone of the modem attorney-client
relationship has, to a large extent, been wrongly taken for granted. The subject
of if and how it is a feature of the relationship has not been addressed
adequately, and contrary to what has been assumed, an accurate portrayal of
client autonomy reveals a relatively minor role. The tall tale of autonomy is
greatly overstated.

188. Duncan Webb, Bounded Autonomy andBounded Zeal, 28 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 273, 281
(2009).
189. Id.
190. FREEDMAN, supra note 11, at 48 (citing Law, supra note 181, at 212-13); Monroe
Freedman, PersonalResponsibility in a ProfessionalSystem, 27 CATH. U. L. REV. 191, 197 (1970)
(citing Fried, supra note 178, at 1073).
191. Freedman, supra note 190, at 197.
192. Webb, supra note 188, at 281.
193. Freedman, supra note 190, at 204.
194. Id.
195. Law, supra note 181, at 212-13.
196. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
197. Fried, supra note 178, at 1071.
198. Pepper, supra note 9, at 618.
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The Attorney-Client Relationship

It is not necessarily obvious where client autonomy fits in the attorney-client
relationship. Identifying its place becomes even more difficult when viewing an
accurate account of the typical attorney-client relationship. As David Wilkins
points out, traditional legal ethics discourse rested on many assumptions about
the typical interaction between a lawyer and a client, assumptions that lacked
accuracy.1 99
The traditional view presumed a relationship between an
unsophisticated, individual client, and a skilled, dedicated solo practitioner who
zealously represents that client within the bounds of the law. 200 This traditional
view, however, was oversimplified and incomplete. It conveniently categorized
all attorneys and clients as the same. In actuality, there are notable and dramatic
differences depending on the nature of the relationship and the circumstances of
the representation. 201 As a consequence, client autonomy within the attorneyclient relationship may not be characterized in a general manner. Its role
depends upon the circumstances of the representation and cannot be made into a
blanket assumption. One cannot assume that lawyers who represent corporate
clients enhance autonomy the same way that lawyers who represent individual
clients do. In either case, however, common ground may be found in client
decision-making.
One of the primary functions of the professional attorney is to counsel and
advise the client, so that the client may make informed decisions regarding the
client's legal objectives and goals. 202
Since autonomy is an internal
achievement203 in which its success revolves around having reasons for choosing
to pursue an objective and having reflected on those reasons,204 an informed
decision does not necessarily imply that it is an autonomous one.

199. David B. Wilkins, Everyday Practice is the Troubling Case, in PROBLEMS

IN

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR A CHANGING PROFESSION 17 (Andrew L. Kaufman & David

B. Wilkins eds., 5th ed. 2009). Katherine Kruse has also pointed out a long-standing misconception
about clients. See Katherine R. Kruse, Beyond CardboardClients in Legal Ethics, 23 GEO. J. LEG.
ETHICS 103, 103 (2010). Kruse argues that lethal ethicists, particularly moral philosophers, presume
clients are one-dimensional cardboard figures who care only about their legal rights and are
indifferent to how those rights affect others. Id. In fact, clients are three-dimensional beings with
moral, social, and religious commitments. Id.
200. Wilkins, supra note 199, at 17; Kruse, supra note 199, at 103.
201. John Heinz and Edward Laumann conducted a detailed study about the social structure of
Chicago lawyers, and they found that attorneys can generally be divided into two hemispheres.
JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE
BAR 127-28 (Nw. U. Press rev. ed. 1994). The first hemisphere involves attorneys that represent
large organizations-labor unions, the government, and corporations. Id. The second hemisphere is
composed of attorneys that represent individuals. Id The study reveals that the nature of the
interaction between lawyer and client differs dramatically depending on which hemisphere,
corporate or individual, the attorney works in. Id
202. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a), 2.1 and accompanying text to supra
note 3.
203. See supra Part II.A. I.
204. See supra Part II.A.I.
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The challenge of client autonomy consists in the manner by which an
attorney advises the client so that in the decision-making process, the client is
not merely informed, but also autonomous. Lawyer advice must carefully be
catered to ensure the client is informed in choosing how to accomplish the
client's goals, and also that the client is the master of those choices. It is worth
noting that it has not always been the case that attorneys favor the client's
autonomy when regarding client decision-making. In 1974, Douglas Rosenthal
addressed this subject in a book titled Lawyer and Client: Who's in Charge.20 5
Rosenthal compared the success of two very different, and at the time highly
controversial, views of the relationship between a professional and a client.
The traditional model, as Rosenthal phrased it, followed the observation of
Alexander Pope, "A little learning is a dangerous thing."207 The professional is
the guiding doctor, and the client is the cooperating patient. 208 The rationale
behind the traditional model is that the professional is skilled and trained,
possessing extensive knowledge of an extremely complicated subject, while the
client is incapable of actively and meaningfully participating due to the client's
limited understanding.209 The traditional model affirmed a form of paternalism
in which the client's best interests were served by allowing the professional to
take full charge of all decision-making, and the client to sit back and defer,
consent, and cooperate with the professional.210 Rosenthal also discussed a
different participation model.211 This model was based upon a collaborative
relationship in which the professional and the client shared an equal status and
212
were equally engaged in the process.
Through an intense empirical study of
personal injury cases, Rosenthal found that the cases in which the client was
actively involved resulted in notably better outcomes.213 At the very least,
Rosenthal's study eliminated the myth that a layman client cannot effectively
make choices in the client's own interests.21
Indeed, the study broadly
demonstrated that laymen, when educated about the relevant matters, add
positive contribution to problem solving, even if it deals with a personal issue. 2 15

205. DOUGLAS ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? (1974).

206. Id at 13.
207. Id at 18.
208. Id. at 9-10 (quoting Thomas Szasz & Marc Hollander, A Contribution to the Philosophy
of Medicine: The Basic Models of the Doctor-PatientRelationship, 97 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED.
585, 587 (1956)).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id at 10.
212. Id
213. Id at 61.
214. Id
215. Id
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Since Rosenthal's book, there has been much literature contributing to the
topic of attorney counseling and client decision-making.2 16 Most of it favors
collaborative and client-centered approaches, bent on enhancing client
autonomy.217 Marcy Strauss proffered a revised attorney-client relationship
model dedicated almost exclusively to preserving and enhancing client
autonomy.218 The emphasis was placed on client decision-making in and over
all aspects of the lawsuit. 2 19 This proposed revision to the attorney-client
relationship has evolved into what is called the client-centered model, a model
particularly emphasized in clinical methodology. 220 The client-centered model
stresses the importance and vitality of having clients actively participate in the
discussion of the client's problems, possible solutions, and ultimate decisions. 22 1
The client-centered approach strives to achieve maximum satisfaction for the
client, making every reasonable effort to accede to the client's ends and means in
the representation. 22 The relationship is distinctly client dominant, yielding to
the client all primary decision-making power, and disregarding the consequences
22'
of the client's wishes.
The purpose
is to attain the autonomy, dignity,
224
morality, and intelligence of the client.

216. See, e.g.,

G.

NICHOLAS HERMAN, JOSEPH E. KENNEDY, & JEAN M. CARY, LEGAL

&

COUNSELING AND NEGOTIATING: A PRACTICAL APPROACH (2001) (discussing risk aversion in the
counseling process).
217. The general presumption, perhaps one among several, necessary for a view promoting
autonomous client decision-making is the broad point that Rosenthal's book made. Clients, when
provided with appropriate information, are capable of reaching a rational decision. See Marcy
Strauss, TowardA Revised Model ofAttorney-Client Relationship:The Argumentfor Autonomy, 65
N.C. L. REV. 315, 340 (1987). To this point, it is helpful to briefly revisit the relationship between
the value of autonomy and pluralism. As stated in Section LB, if we value autonomy, we value that
there are many different ways to find worth in self-determining one's life that may or may not be
contrary to each other's. There is rarely a right or wrong decision, and the best decision can seldom
be identified. Id In other words, that a lawyer would have chosen differently than a client, or even
believes a client's decision to be wrong, is irrelevant to the purposes and promotion of an autonomy
enhancing approach to the attorney-client relationship. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id As a corollary to this, however, room was left for situations in which the legal issue
was so complex that the attorney's best efforts to provide the client with the appropriate information
would not suffice to ensure an informed decision, or when client decision-making jeopardizes the
legal process. Id. at 340-41.
220. HERMAN ET AL., supra note 216, at 11 (citing DAVID A. BINDER, PAUL BERGMAN,
SUSAN C. PRICE, LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT CENTERED APPROACH

18 (1991)).

221. Id at 11-12 (citing BINDER ET AL., supra note 220, at 19-22).
222. Id. at 12 (quoting BINDER ET AL., supra note 220, at 18, 261).
223. Id. Because this model is concerned only with fulfilling the client's wishes and pays no
heed to their consequences, it has been called the "hired-gun" model. Id. This is not to say, of
course, that a lawyer should assist a client in unlawful conduct. See Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling
at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the Jurisprudenceand Ethics ofLawyering, 104 YALE L.J.
1545, 1599 (1995) (limiting a lawyer's assistance to a client to lawful conduct-conduct within the
bounds of law).
224. BINDER ET AL., supra note 220, at 18.
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The crux of the client-centered model hinges on a dedicated attorney,
advising a layman client in a manner that facilitates active and effective
225
First and foremost, this entails a
engagement in the decision-making process.
duty to inform the client of any and all relevant law.226 Pepper extends this duty
to all attorneys, regardless of their commitment to increasing individual
autonomy.227 It also entails active and ongoing client communication so that the
attorney has a comprehensive grasp of the client's exact goals and interests. 22 8
Finally, it entails releasing the client to make a decision that is independent of all
coercion, manipulation, and even excessive influence on the attorney's part. 229
To synthesize the above paragraphs, the role of client autonomy in the
attorney-client relationship is an active one. It requires a faithful, extremely
conscientious attorney that unfailingly presents all the important and relevant
information necessary for a layman client to make an informed decision, and
does so in a neutral manner that avoids coercing, manipulating, and even
influencing the client to make a decision that is not sufficiently independent of
the attorney's. This is no mean achievement.
IV.

THE CONCEPTUAL AND TRANSACTIONAL PROBLEM WITH AUTONOMY

A.

The Conceptual Problem

There are two inherent problems when it comes to client autonomy and its
assumption-a conceptual one and a transactional one. First, there is a
conceptual problem. As previously stated, achieving autonomy is an internal
230
In the words of
achievement, and it depends on the autonomous individual.
Raz, "it is the special character of autonomy that one cannot make another
person autonomous." 23 1 A horse can be brought to the water, but not be made to
232
While a person may appear to be leading an autonomous life, it is the
drink.
internal reflection and reasoning that makes a person's actions, goals, and
projects autonomous. Autonomy has little to do with carrying out the projects of

225. See generally id (discussing the conceptual differences between client-centered and
traditional concepts of lawyering).
226. Pepper, supra note 223, at 1599.
227. Id Clients have an interest in and are entitled to knowledge of the law that governs them.
Id. In fact, our form of government suggests that a person may even have a right to know the law.
Id
228. Id. at 1601. Acknowledging that a "bad-man" client might use knowledge of the law to
pursue wicked goals, inflicting a moral dilemma on the attorney-consisting of deciding between a
duty to inform the client of the law and a desire to protect the public well-being or avoid assisting
an injury to a third party-Pepper is careful to include a premise here. Id. (citing Oliver W. Holmes,
The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 459 (1897)). An attorney must not assume the client's
goals or desires. Id. The attorney must have open dialogue with the client. Id.
229. Id. at 1607.
230. See supra Part II.A. I.
231. RAZ, supra note 1, at 407.
2 3 2. Id.
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an individual. Rather, it concerns how the person reached the conclusion to
pursue a particular project. To make this relevant, a client seeking representation
will not necessarily achieve autonomy if the attorney assists the client in making
an informed decision regarding the client's legal options. The client must be the
one to reflect on why the client desires to take one legal avenue over another,
and have reasons on which the ultimate decision is based. The attorney cannot
perform this task for the client. The attorney may, however, put the client in the
best situated position to do the task. This involves more than simply refraining
from coercion and manipulation. 233
While Raz is firm on the issue that one can be autonomous only if one
determines to do so by oneself, Raz does accept and promote that others can help
in securing the preconditions of autonomy. 23 Raz is referring to autonomy in
the secondary sense, including the conditions of mental ability, independence,
and an adequate range of options.235 Furthermore, Raz compels everyone to help
secure these preconditions.236 Thus, while an attorney cannot-that is, it is
conceptually impossible for an attorney to enhance a client's autonomy in the
primary sense of achieving autonomy-an attorney can help in assisting a client
to create and develop the inner capacities necessary for a person to act
autonomously. 237

This could include developing the cognitive abilities of a client, the power to
absorb information about the law, understand the consequences of legal
decisions, and develop the type of reasoning capacity useful to solving legal
problems.238 It could also include creating or advising an adequate range of
options that a client could choose from. 2 39 Obviously, it is neither expected nor
constructive for an attorney to go beyond assisting a client's legal problem and
essentially provide a client with a law school education. There is something to
be said, however, about an attorney helping a client understand the legal issue in
a manner sufficient for the client to make an informed decision. In addition, an
attorney can certainly inform a client of all the options, detailing the pros and
cons of each and thereby helping in that particular sense. Finally, an attorney
can advise and assist a client in effectively exercising those options to the
client's advantage.

233. Id.

234. Id
235. See id.
236. Id.
237. Id at 407-08. It should be noted that securing the preconditions to autonomy could lead
to achieving autonomy. It is the logical step to achieving the primary sense of autonomy. This is a
much weaker, and quite different, conclusion, however, than stating that securing the preconditions
to autonomy is increasing an individual's autonomy. It merely helps by increasing the likelihood
that a person could exercise autonomy. Furthermore, in and of itself, there is nothing especially
praiseworthy about securing the preconditions of autonomy for an individual. Instead, as Raz
explains, it is a duty that everyone has to each other. Id. at 407-09.
238. Id at 408.
239. Id
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The gist of the conceptual problem is that an attorney is confined only to
helping her clients secure the secondary sense capacity for autonomy that can,
but does not always, lead to the autonomous life. A very weak thesis remains in
that attorneys, at best, can help direct their clients to that stage of autonomy
without ever being able to ensure they act upon it. What makes this weaker, still,
is that every layperson can do the same and even has such a duty. 2 4 0
No one can make another person achieve autonomy.241 Attorneys are no
exception. However, everyone has a duty to help secure the secondary sense of
autonomy for each other.2 This is not a duty unique to attorneys. The concern
is that legal ethics has assigned to autonomy a moral weight that would suggest
In
attorneys are exceptionally situated to increase autonomy for their clients.
addition, the implication is that such a moral capacity exists because of their role
as attorneys and their specialized skill and knowledge. To put it another way,
the position of an attorney implies a supererogatory function, a moral function
going above and beyond the call of duty, when it comes to advancing autonomy.
It would be one thing if client autonomy was treated as an ideal that attorneys
ought to pay attention to. Instead, it is treated as a quintessential moral argument
that defines and justifies attorney amoralit .24 Since all people have the duty of
securing the preconditions of autonomy, there is nothing morally special about
attorneys' participation in this duty. To claim otherwise is to exaggerate the role
of autonomy in the attorney-client relationship. Unfortunately, this has been the
lot of moral and legal theory, inaccurately portraying and overstating autonomy.
One might counter, considering the above, that while the argument from
client autonomy is significantly diminished, it is by no means destroyed
completely. The rationale being that within the context of the legal system, only
a lawyer has the knowledge and ability to help secure the preconditions of
autonomy.246 Even if making a person autonomous is conceptually impossible,
and securing the preconditions of autonomy is the duty of everyone, not
everyone is poised to secure the mental ability, independence, and adequate
options for someone facing the legal system. In fact, such a duty may be
exclusive to attorneys. Therefore, even though it is only the secondary sense of
autonomy, it is still the special function of lawyers to preserve and increase it.
While this argument has potential, it is painstakingly undermined by the second
problem associated with client autonomy and its assumption-the transactional
problem.

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
RAZ, supra note 1, at 407.
Id. at 407-08.
Law, supra note 181, at 212-13.
Pepper, supra note 223, at 617.
RAZ, supra note 1, at 407.
Pepper, supra note 223, at 617.
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The TransactionalProblem:
1.

In Securing the Appropriate Mental Abilities

The transactional problem concerns the reality that attorneys rarely succeed
in securing the secondary sense of autonomy. First, consider the transactional
problem when it comes to assisting a client to develop the appropriate mental
abilities. As stated above, an attorney cannot give a client a law school
education. The information and context must be succinct and precise. Even
assuming that an attorney does an exceptional job of explaining the legal
concepts to the layman client, it is still highly probable that the client will not
fully understand and appreciate the information. The law can be extremely
difficult to understand, even for a professional.247 The client may be apathetic to
learning the law and disinterested in being included in the decision-making
process, much less coming to a comprehensive understanding of the legal issue.
In addition, the client may be more concerned with achieving the client's
financial, political, or social interests than understanding the law involved in
achieving them.
There are additional time and financial constraints. Explaining the lawespecially when dealing with complex issues-takes time-a lot of time. A
lawyer does not always have the time, nor does the client have the finances, to
help secure the appropriate mental abilities for an informed decision-making
process.248 Arguably, it is even inappropriate for a professional to afford the
time to do so. 2 In the same vein, the legal profession is fraught with marketbased pressures that even well-intentioned attorneys cannot always escape.250 In
his book, Lawyers in the Dock, Richard Abel richly chronicles the professional
lives of six attorneys who fell into a trap of professional misconduct and
wrongful lawyer behavior. 25 1 What is so fascinating and alarming about his six
case studies is that the studies involve hardworking, good-natured attorneys who
simply could not keep up with the demands of their otherwise successful
careers.252 Abel's book shows that well-intentioned attorneys unintentionally
253
violate the rules of professional conduct.
The culture, competitiveness, and

247. Strauss, supra note 217, at 340.
248. Strauss admits that there are circumstances in which an attorney may never be able to
explain the law in a manner that equips a client to make an informed decision about it. See supra
notes 217-218 and accompanying text.
249. One might consider the metaphor of a doctor explaining to his patient the way in which a
particular drug works to alleviate pain. The patient has come to the doctor to feel better. While the
patient wants to know the drug's side effects, he is not particularly concerned with expending time
to understand the chemical process of the drug.
250. See generally RICHARD L. ABEL, LAWYERS IN THE DOCK (2008) (chronicling six case
studies of attorney misconduct and wrongful behavior).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
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overreaching goals of the legal profession leave little time for attorneys to reflect
on whether they are adhering to the rules of professional conduct. 54 Indeed,
these goals leave even less time for the type of conscientious reflection necessary
to secure the appropriate mental abilities of a client.
Considering all of the above, it is extremely difficult and unlikely for an
attorney to help a client secure the mental capacity for the exercise of autonomy.
Adding to this difficulty, there are psychological and emotional obstacles. A
client seeking legal representation could be experiencing a traumatic event. 2 55
For example, the client may be charged with a felony, going through a divorce,
or being sued for a substantial amount. The trauma may have such an effect that
the client is incapable of making rational decisions, ones within the client's best
interest and not driven by emotions and feelings. 256 William Simon, in his
article discussing lawyer advice and client autonomy, illustrates this point by
comparing it to an experience he had with his pediatrician.257 Simon's twomonth-old son needed a vaccination that contained the small probability of an
adverse reaction.258 Simon felt paralyzed.259 The stress of deciding whether his
child should receive the vaccination was a matter so deeply personal and
emotional that he felt incapable of thinking rationally about the circumstances.260
He wanted to defer to the doctor's wisdom because he did not believe he could
make the correct decision. 261 There is no doubt that many clients face the same
dilemma.
2.

In Securing Independence

Secondly, transactional problems obstruct securing the precondition of
independence.262 Apart from how a trauma may affect a client's independence,
there are transactional problems, both voluntary and involuntary, in the way that
an attorney presents information and options to the client.263 Moreover, there are
institutional barriers that also limit securing the independence of a client.
Independence as a precondition to autonomy is invaded by coercion and
manipulation from others.264 An individual lacks independence when decisions
are made, not according to that individual's own interests and preferences, but

254. See generally Eli Wald, Book Review, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 311 (2009) (reviewing Abel's
case studies of lawyer misconduct).
255. See William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case, 50 MD.
L. REv. 213, 216 (1991).
256. Id
257. Simon, supra note 255, at 216.
258. Id. at 216-17.
259. Id.
260. Id
261. Id.
262. Strauss, supra note 217, at 341-42.
263. Id.
264. See RAZ, supranote 1, at 377.
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due to external forces.265 In the most offensive cases, the attorney is the
powerful, paternalistic master that coerces the client to make decisions according
to the attorney's interests.266 Such an attorney will also manipulate the client for
purposes of the attorney's own financial or social gain.267 Clearly, the attorney
is maliciously invading the independence of the client. 2 68
There are also cases in which. an attorney nonmaliciously, though still
voluntarily, invades the independence of a client. Ann Southworth conducted a
detailed empirical study about the views and practices of lawyer-client decisionmaking.269 Specifically, Southworth found that attorneys involved in legal
services and law school clinics, essentially attorneys concerned with poverty
law, were disinclined to attempt to secure any sort of independence for their
clients. 270 Poverty law attorneys reported that their clients almost never become
involved in forming strategies or participating in the decision-making process. 271
These attorneys explain that their clients have "no idea what to do" when
confronted with a legal problem, and wholly rely on their attorneys to solve the
problem for them. 272 They further report that their clients' interests, because of
their intellectual, financial, and social vulnerability, are only served by a
paternalistic model of lawyering.273 They believe securing client independence
and autonomy has a harmful effect on these clients and ought to be
discouraged. 274
A lawyer's failure to secure the independence of his client is not always
voluntary. 75
Sometimes the attorney is trying to genuinely establish
independent client decision-making. Unfortunately, the attorney may not fully
escape involuntarily invading his client's independence. Simon soberly admits
that the gap between approaching lawyer advice with a paternalistic or autonomy
enhancing mindset is not as wide as one might hope.
Simon identifies the

265. See id. at 377-78.
266. Strauss, supra note 217, at 342.
267. Id
268. See Ann Southworth, Lawyer-Client Decisionmaking in Civil Rights and Poverty
Practice:An EmpiricalStudy ofLawyers'Norms, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHiCS 1101, 1105 (1996).
269. See generally id (discussing Southworth's empirical study regarding the views and
practices of lawyer-client decision-making). Southworth surveyed the differences between lawyers
working in the fields of legal services, law school clinics, advocacy organizations, civil rights, grass
roots organizations, and private business law. Id. at 1107.
270. See id. at 1105.
271. See id. at 1109-10.
272. Id. at 1109.
273. See id. at 1128.
274. See generally id. at 1136-37 (discussing the problems of resource constraints and
negative psychological effects on the lawyer from being deprived of an independent role).
275. See id. at 1132.
276. See Simon, supra note 255, at 224. But see Mark Spiegel, The Case of Mrs. Jones
Revisited: Paternalismand Autonomy in Lawyer-Client Counseling, 1997 B.Y.U. L. REv. 307, 309
(1997) (noting that "[t]here remain important differences between lawyers who act according to the
dictates of the autonomy model and lawyers who are 'refined paternalists"').
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great difficulty in presenting information to a client in a neutral way.27 Even
when an attorney gives special care to the way the attorney presents information,
there remains a substantial risk that the attorney will inadvertently influence or
manipulate the client.278 It is extraordinarily difficult for attorneys to present
options, void of their own influence, even when set on doing so.279 The order in
which options are presented, the emphasis and time dedicated to explanation, the
details and expressions an attorney uses, and things buried in the attorney's
subconscious have a negative effect on a client's independence.280 Robert
Gordon argues that corporate lawyers "influence their clients to some extent,
whether they want to or not." 281 Corporate lawyers do this simply by the manner
and setting in which they present advice, by plainly submitting to company
norms, or by changing company culture with the exploitation of certain leverage
points.282 Lawyers devoted to securing the independence of their clients face an
uphill battle. Much of the struggle to do so is, at the very least, unknown, and at
the very most, entirely outside of their control.
Finally, the legal profession as an institution has its own interest in limiting
client independence.
Gordon discusses the ideal that lawyers, in the greater
pursuit of maintaining an effective and functioning pluralist society-a healthy
society-must retain some independence as professionals.284 In addition to their
clients' interests, lawyers ought to support the interests of the general public,
"even when doing so hurts their clients." 285 The sacrifice made to the particular
client's interests is justified, and required, in order for a society to operate
well.286 Gordon adds, in another article, that the legal-social framework is a
common good, a common good that a selfish individual could destroy for
everyone if a lawyer is not careful.287 This is especially relevant when applied to
corporate clients who might try to abuse the system of law and use their lawyers

277. See Simon, supra note 255, at 217.
278. See id.
279. See id.
280. See id.
281. Robert W. Gordon, The Independence ofLawyers, 68 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 30 (1988). Gordon
mentions that one ideal requires lawyers to reflect critically on the way they influence their clients,
and to change accordingly if the results of their influence are bad. See id
282. Id
283. See generally id at 1-19 (pointing to lawyers' interests in preserving corporate selfregulation, control over their conditions of work, and political independence).
284. Id at 17.
285. Id
286. Id. at 17-18.
287. See Robert W. Gordon, Why Lawyers Can'tJust Be Hired Guns, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE
42, 46 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000). As the title suggests, Gordon is arguing against a hired gun
model of lawyering. See id at 42. This model of lawyering defeats some of the good the law is
intended to provide. See id at 46. Anthony Kronman agrees that part of a lawyer's job is to be
directly concerned with the public good, the integrity of the legal system, its fairness, and the wellbeing of the community. See Anthony T. Kronman, The Law as a Profession, in ETHICS IN
PRACTICE 29, 31 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000). Such a view is likely incompatible with a hired gun
model.
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to achieve goals that are not within their legal rights. 288 In such a situation, the
legal profession would strive to prevent independent decision-making, and
influence the client to act in a manner consistent with the common good. This
may be the morally preferable option, but it is nonetheless incompatible with
securing the independence of client decision-making.
3.

In Securing an Adequate Range of Options

Lastly, an attorney has little control over securing an adequate range of
options for a client. 289 An adequate range of good options is not always in the
cards. It is not enough for a client to have a choice among several bad options,
or even between one good option and one bad option. 290 A client must have a
choice between a variety of good options to enjoy an autonomous life. 291
There are occasions when a client seeks representation that will involve an
292
For example, if the client
attorney presenting several different good options.
desires to form a partnership, start a business, negotiate a deal, or adopt a child.
The attorney informs the client how best to go about the endeavor, and presents
293
the several options, as well as different benefits and risks.
Such a situation is
probably most common when representing corporate clients and wealthier
individuals. 294

In large part, however, the client is not faced with a variety of good options.
Instead, the client has retained counsel because the client faces a problem.295
The attorney only has the occasion to inform the client which option is the best
option among several dissatisfying choices.296 For example, a divorce attorney
has to advise the client about different options in splitting up assets or parenting
time. A client facing eviction is provided different defenses or maybe told to
find a new place. Even plaintiff attorneys seeking damages for their clients are
merely providing options derived from a very traumatizing experience, options
that are hardly good in comparison to the event not occurring. The same can be
297
true in the corporate sphere where high stakes litigation is common.

288. See Gordon, supra note 287, at 47 (discussing the power possessed by attorneys
representing large corporations and the far-ranging impact of their policy decisions).
289. See Southworth, supra note 268, at 1112.
290. See RAZ, supra note 1, at 373.
291. See id.
292. See Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717, 746 (1987).
293. See Charles R. Schaefer, You and Your Eager Entrepreneur, BUS. L. TODAY Nov.-Dec.
1995, at 43, 44 (weighing and outlining the myriad of decisions clients and attorneys must make in
buying and selling small businesses).
294. See Ellmann, supra note 292, at 718.
295. See Southworth, supra note 268, at 1112.
296. Cf RAZ, supra note 1, at 373-74 (using The Man in the Pit and The Hounded Woman as
instances where the client may only be able to choose from undesirable options).
297. See N.Y. State Bar Corporate Counsel Section, Report on Cost-Effective Management of
CorporateLitigation, 59 ALB. L. REV. 263, 295 (1995).
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Attorneys in such situations advise about settlement options or the risks of
enduring a painstaking trial.298
An adequate range of options means clients have several good options, and
they are aware of those options and the meaning of their choices among them. 2 99
The above circumstances are neither adequate, nor provide an opportunity for
clients to understand the meaning of their choices. When faced with a difficult
legal problem, a person is not striving to achieve a goal. 300 The client is often
struggling to avoid possible consequences. 3 0 1 Informing the client in these cases
is not securing an adequate range of options.
The common objection might be that no one expects an attorney to provide
an adequate range of options.3
Instead, the attorney's role involves enabling
the client to make the best of the hand the client has been dealt. 3 0 3 The most
talented attorneys discover creative and inventive options for their clients,304 but
they cannot simply erase an unfortunate event. It mi ht also be argued that since
autonomy is an ideal experienced only to a degree,30 one unfortunate event does
not eradicate a client's autonomy.
This objection only affirms the transactional problem. It acknowledges that
attorneys are incapable of enhancing autonomy for some of their clients. This is
not intended to suggest that a client is no longer leading an autonomous life.
Rather, it reveals that some legal issues present circumstances that do not
contribute to an individual's achievement of autonomy. In those circumstances,
it is impossible for the attorney to increase a client's autonomy. Securing an
3 6
adequate range of options is a rare accomplishment for the average attorney.
V.

DEFLATING AUTONOMY

The conceptual problem, on its own, significantly undermines the value of
autonomy as a moral argument. An attorney is limited to helping secure the
secondary sense of autonomy, which is a duty that everyone has, and is neither
unique nor morally special. Because everyone is capable of helping others
secure these conditions, then the moral justification would equally apply to all

298. See id.
299. See RAZ, supra note 1, at 389-90.
300. Cf Simon, supra note 255, at 216 (considering Mrs. Jones' desire for Simon to choose
the legal option that would adversely affect her record the least).
301. Cf id. (describing Mrs. Jones' choice to accept the plea bargain rather than risk losing at
trail or going to jail).
302. Cf Southworth, supra note 268, at 1112 (stating that lawyers often do not provide an
adequate range of options because there are not many options to choose from).
303. See id. at 1135.
304. Cordell Parvin, Creative Thinking Separates Top Lawyers, CORDELL PARVIN BLOG (Jan.
27, 2011), http://www.cordellblog.com/career-development/creative-thinking-separates-toplawyers/.
305. See RAZ, supra note 1, at 156.
306. See Southworth, supra note 268, at 1112.
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individuals.307 In other words, anyone and everyone would be justified in acting
immorally if for the purpose of securing the preconditions for autonomy.
Granted, an autonomy-valuing society does entail a form of moral pluralism,3 08
but it would be ridiculous to argue that all immoral and wrongful conduct is
justified in the name of securing another's capacity for autonomy. Such a case is
really not too far off from the current status of autonomy invoked in legal
ethics.3 09
A weaker argument then becomes that attorneys alone have the special duty
of securing the preconditions of autonomy within the system of law. This,
however, is undermined when embracing the greater, more serious, transactional
problem. Attorneys are rarely successful in securing even the secondary sense of
autonomy for their clients.
An attorney may never accomplish this duty,
which all persons have. The cases in which an attorney can and does help set the
background stage for autonomy are rather the exception than the rule, and they
rely on a variety of events, some within the attorney's control but many outside
of it.3 1 The distasteful conclusion is that attorneys are lacking in this area, and
are certainly not morally praiseworthy.
Recognizing the conceptual and transactional problem sheds light on the
demanding nature of autonomy. More specifically, it reveals that the argument
for autonomy fails almost entirely on the theoretical level and faces dramatic
limitations in practice. Even as aspirational, autonomy plays an insignificant
role in the attorney-client relationship. This deflated role is duly troubling
because autonomy serves as a profound piece to the understanding of attorney
morality. 3 12 By wrongly exaggerating the extent to which it is a feature of the
attorney-client relationship, the strength of its moral weight is thrown into
jeopardy. To put it bluntly, celebrating client autonomy as a moral justification
is specious. To take its limitations seriously means a new dialogue in legal
ethics, one proceeding with caution.
This paper contends that client autonomy is not a moral justification, but it is
nonetheless a value each professional should be committed to.
A. Deflating the Moral Argument of Client Autonomy
As a moral justification, autonomy is dissatisfactory and inadequate. When
Pepper first used client autonomy to defend the amoral role of attorneys, it was
presented as a catch all justification for lawyer morality. 313 Providing access to

307. See RAZ, supra note 1, at 407.
308. See id at 395-98.
309. See id. at 407.
310. See supra Part IV.B.1.
311. See Simon, supra note 255, at 224.
312. See FREEDMAN, supra note 11, at 48.
313. See Stephen Pepper, Integrating Morality and Law in Legal Practice: A Reply to
Professor Simon, 23 GEO. J. L. ETHICS 1011 (2010).
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the law, according to Pepper, is inherently an autonomy-enhancing ac314
Therefore, attorneys, because they increase autonomy, are justified in acting
immorally because they are contributing to an overall moral good. 1 Pepper has
since clarified his argument.316 The focus has shifted from being justified in
acting immorally, to not being morally responsible for the client's autonomously
chosen conduct. 3 While the distinction is subtle, it is important. In the first, an
attorney acts only on behalf of the wishes of the client.3 18 The attorney is neither
conscious of personal morality, nor thoughtful of the client's. In the second, the
9
attorney is morally conscious and engages in a moral dialogue with the client. 31
In fact, the attorney has ethical obligations to counsel the client as to whether a
certain action is right. 32 0 If the client has a legal option that, in the attorney's
view, is morally wrong or at the very least is inconsistent with justice, the
attorney must clarify that to the client.32 In the end, however, it is the client's
ultimate decision what to do-and the attorney must honor that-and thus it is
the client who is morally responsible for the conduct.3 2 2 The lawyer is
responsible for ensuring that the client knows the conduct is morally wrong, but
not responsible for the morally wrong conduct.323 Still, this view is not prudent
enough.
Pepper's suggested method of moral dialogue seems to be correct, but the
workings of client autonomy remain overstated and taken for granted. The
argument continues to assume that the client's actions, after engaging in a moral
dialogue with the attorney, are autonomous.324 The conceptual and transactional

314. See id. at 1016.
315. This Article intentionally refrains from addressing whether this reasoning is objectionable
on other grounds; for example, whether enhancing autonomy is morally valuable when the
autonomously chosen action is immoral. Autonomy may be lacking as a moral justification for other
reasons, but since this Article argues that attorneys do not enhance autonomy, discussing the
proceeding moral implications is unnecessary. For a list of objections to autonomy on other
grounds, see supra note 152 and accompanying text.
316. In responding to a critique, Pepper clarifies that morality is not irrelevant, but that the
ultimate decision on how to act rests with the client and not the attorney. See Pepper, supra note
313, at 1028. Therefore, the ultimate moral responsibility rests with the client and not the attorney.
See id.
317. See id at 1012.
318. See id.
319. The lawyer has an obligation to inform the client on the following: "(1) the basic law at
issue or to be applied; (2) the reasons for the legal provisions or the purposes they serve; and (3) the
overall morality of the situation as best understood by the lawyer." Id. at 1039. If the lawyer proves
diligent in that task, then the lawyer is not morally responsible for the client's decision. See id.
320. See id. at 1018 (quoting Stephen L. Pepper, Lawyer's Ethics in the Gap Between Law and
Justice, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 181, 190-91 (1991) [hereinafter Pepper, Gap]).
321. See id. (citing Pepper, Gap, supra note 320, at 190-91); see also Stephen L. Pepper, The
Lawyer Knows More Than the Law, 90 TEX. L. REv. 691, 699 (2012) [hereinafter Pepper, The
Lawyers Knows].
322. See Pepper, supra note 313, at 1039.
323. See id.
324. See id.
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problems declare otherwise. In this method of moral counseling, the attorney
would have to effectively secure the appropriate mental abilities, independence,
and adequate range of options for the client. To be exact, the client must fully
understand the consequences surrounding a decision to act. The client must have
sufficient independence from the influence of the attorney's moral opinions and
advice. Finally, a variety of different options, all of which are good, must be
made available to the client. Even in the rare chance an attorney is able to secure
all of that, the rarer chance that it is even within the attorney's control, it is by no
means certain the client will achieve autonomy. In all respects, it is more likely
the client will not. Therefore, it can hardly be said that the attorney is free from
moral responsibility.
To illustrate with a common legal ethics example, consider the valid debt
that has passed the statute of limitations period. The debtor is a wealthy
businessman who can easily pay the debt. The creditor, however, struggles
financially to survive. The attorney, being mindful of both the statute of
limitations defense as well as the debt's validity, fully explains the options to the
client. The attorney reveals that the statute of limitations bars the creditor from
enforcing the debt.
The attorney further counsels the client that utilizing this
defense would impose an unfair harm on the creditor who, after all, is owed the
money. The client fully understands the options, and the moral and legal
consequences associated with those options. Further, the attorney has not
interfered with the client's independence by imposing the attorney's own
opinion. It would seem the decision, resting solely on the client, of whether to
avoid paying the debt is an autonomous one.
To the contrary, a truly autonomous decision in this example may not be
possible. The client may dislike both of the options. The client may believe that
paying the debt is the morally right thing to do, but nonetheless is a financially
bad option. On the other hand, the client may not want to use the statute of
limitations defense because the client believes it would be immoral, despite the
fact that it is financially better. In this scenario, the client is not really in a
position to act autonomously. The client is not presented with an adequate range
of options. The client is left with insufficient options to embark on the process
of reflecting on and developing reasons for choosing one option over the other.
A critic would point to the fact that the client freely made a decision without
the attorney's interference. Even if the client does not like the choices, the client
still chose one over the other. This mindset wrongly equates autonomy with
negative liberty, being free from the control of others. Autonomy is more
demanding than that. It requires that the individual has available several
adequate options and chooses one option after reflecting and providing a reason
for doing so.326 While the client may have a reason as to why the client
ultimately chose to avoid paying the debt, this choice does not contribute to the

325. See id. at 1023.
326. See RAZ, supra note 1, at 375.
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client's otherwise autonomous life. It is instead a hiccup on the autonomy
continuum.
The attorney in this scenario is in no position to secure the preconditions of
autonomy. Due to the inadequacy of choice, enhancing the client's autonomy is
impossible. Therefore, from a moral standpoint, the attorney would not be free
from moral responsibility. If the client asks the attorney to draft the legal
document to dismiss the debt, the attorney is not justified in doing so on the
grounds that the attorney enhanced the client's autonomy. Indeed, the attorney
did not.
This example may seem crass, especially when conceding that autonomy is
an ideal, but it accurately demonstrates the considerable limitations an attorney
faces when it comes to advancing client autonomy. The complications visible
here represent only a fraction of the reality. In some circumstances, an attorney
will not be able to enhance a client's autonomy even when the attorney makes a
conscientious effort not to interfere with it. If this is taken seriously, the moral
argument for autonomy is almost entirely deflated.
B.

Client Autonomy and Professionalism

From this deflated position, the function of client autonomy properly
emerges not as a moral justification, but as a value an attorney becomes
committed to when entering the profession. The system of law affirms that
327
autonomy is both important and valuable.
The law is intended to be both an
instrument by which citizens may exercise autonomy and also a guardian that
protects it.328 Citizens who subscribe to this legal system are expected to respect
the autonomy of others, to let others choose freely their own individual values
329
and self-determine their own individual goals.
One of the responsibilities an
attorney has when entering the profession is striving to secure and protect client
autonomy.3

30

In Wendel's book, Lawyers and Fidelity to Law, in which he defends, as the
title suggests, ethical duties centered upon allegiance and diligence to the
purpose and political legitimacy of the legal system, he makes a similar point.331
Wendel reintroduces autonomy from a political standpoint instead of a moral
one.332 Wendel's argument for client autonomy relies on the political values of
"liberty, equality, and the rule of law." 333 Instead of a moral notion, the
emphasis is placed on ensuring that one's autonomy is not limited unless on the
grounds of objective and impartial rules, ones which openly limit autonomy for

327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.

See supra Part I.B.
See Pepper, supra note 9, at 616.
See supra Part II.B.
See FREEDMAN, supra note 11, at 48 (citing Law, supra note 181, at 212).
See WENDEL, supra note 6, at 35.
Id. at 35.
Id.
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everyone, and only for worthwhile purposes. 334 Under this view, autonomy
means allowing clients to freely exercise their legal entitlements without the
attorney's interference. 335 Wendel's position on autonomy contributes to his
holistic account of loyalty to the law, and he is careful not to color outside the
lines.
Accordingly, client autonomy is only relevant within the legal framework
when choosing to exercise a legal entitlement.336 Wendel urges client autonomy
to the extent that he discourages a lawyer from interfering with a client's choice
to exercise a legal right that results in morally wrongful conduct. 337 The client is
the primary actor, and the lawyer must refrain from inflicting personal morals
and values onto the client. 338 Eli Wald and Russell Pearce have exposed a
possible shortcoming. 339 Wald and Pearce present an example in which a client
wants to put together a deal and is given the option between two plans. 340 Under
plan A, the client will receive $1.5 million.
Under plan B, the client will
receive $2 million, but will impose moderate costs on innocent third parties for
which the client will not be legally responsible.342 If the client wants to
maximize profits and also follow the law, how should the lawyer advise the
client? 343 Wald and Pearce worry that Wendel's view is agnostic on the issue;

Wendel affirms this is true.344 It is the client's decision, and the attorney must
respect that and refrain from imposing the attorney's own self-righteousness on
the client.345 While both Pepper and Wendel agree that the lawyer is not morally
responsible if the client chooses plan B, Wendel differs from Pepper on the
subject of moral counseling.346 Wendel disagrees that the attorney has any
obligation to discuss the attorney's own moral opinions with the client. 347 The
attorney is hired to distinguish between lawful and unlawful conduct, not moral
and immoral conduct.348 Wendel is using autonomy in its political sense, not its
moral sense.

349

334. Id
335. Id. at 37.
336. See W. Bradley Wendel, Putting Morality in its Place, 15 LEGAL ETHICS 175, 177
(2012).
337. Wendel, supranote 152, at 1082.
338. See id.
339 Eli Wald & Russell G. Pearce, Beyond CardboardLawyers in Legal Ethics, 15 LEGAL
ETHICS 147, 157 (2012).
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id

344. Id. at 158, 159; Wendel, supra note 336, at 176.
345. See W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics is About the Law, Not Morality or Justice: A Reply
to Critics, 90 TEX. L. REV. 727, 737-38 (2012) (citing Pepper, The Lawyer Knows, supra note 321,
at 695.
346. Id. at 738 n.50.
347. Id.
348. Wendel, supra note 336, at 177.
349. WENDEL, supra note 6, at 35.
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Wendel takes a more grounded position on autonomy by confining it to the
political context, but rather than requiring attorneys to strive after securing the
autonomy of their clients, he argues they must simply avoid actively interfering
with it.3 By framing client autonomy as a value in professionalism, this Article
is careful not to overstate its role within the attorney-client relationship, but also
not to undermine its importance within the legal system. The expectation of
professionalism is that attorneys will strive to secure the preconditions of
autonomy for their clients, even with the knowledge that they have very little
power to do so.351

Attorney professionalism, as understood in this Article, regards an ideal, one
in which each member of the bar becomes committed.
As an ideal,
professionalism primarily concerns morals, though it also concerns occupational
and educational responsibilities.352 Professionalism refers to the ethics of
character, the importance of virtues, and the image and spirit of the noble
lawyer.353
The professional ideal recognizes that attorneys have moral
obligations that ordinary people do not. 354 Among these are obligations to their
clients, to the system of law, and to the public. 355 Each professional commits to
these obligations. 3 56
While the notion of professionalism is partially vague, it is not altogether
indefinite. The legal profession and its members define many of the moral
obligations which compose the professional ideal.357 The Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, for example, serve as both regulations as well as moral
guidelines.
In some circumstances, the Rules clarify how a lawyer must act,
and in others they provide guidelines for how a lawyer should act.359 To use an
example, every attorney is committed to volunteer service.360 Specifically, the

350. Id. at 36.
351. See JACK L. SAMMONS, JR., LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 8 (1988).

352. Michael Davis, Professionalism Means Putting Your Profession First, in ETHICS AND
THE LEGAL PROFESSION 159, 160-61 (Elliot Cohen & Michael Davis eds., 2d ed. 2009).
353. See Thomas L. Shaffer, InauguralHoward Lichtenstein Lecture in Legal Ethics: Lawyer
Professionalism As A Moral Argument, 26 GONZ. L. REV. 393, 405 (1991). Shaffer argues that
professionalism bears in mind the concept of the "lawyer-gentleman," the person who is an architect
of society, an aristocrat, promoting and instigating positive change, standing up for those without a
voice, and having the interests of others at his forefront. Id. at 398, 399 n.22. Shaffer, however,
acknowledges that professionalism has dark aspects as well-gender, race, and class
discrimination-and he is wary about those who avoid their discussion. Id. at 401 n.26.
354. Davis, supra note 352, at 164.
355. Nancy J. Moore, "In the Interests of Justice": Balancing Client Loyalty and the Public
Good in the Twenty-First Century, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 1775, 1791 (2002) (citing Nancy J.
Moore, The Usefulness of Ethical Codes, 1989 ANN. SURV. OF AM. LAW 7, 13 (1989); Ted
Schneyer, The ALI's Restatement and the ABA's Model Rules: Rivals or Complements?, 46 OKLA.
L. REV. 25, 28 (1993)).
356. Id.
357. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, PREAMBLE & SCOPE (2011).

358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id at R. 6.1.
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Model Rules state that every attorney should aspire to provide fifty hours of pro
bono legal services.361 Similarly, so must an attorney aspire after client
autonomy.
Striving to secure the preconditions of client autonomy is one of the
obligations, one of the commitments, a professional has.362 Jack Sammons, in
his book Lawyer Professionalism, argues that professionalism may be boiled
down into one thing-meaningful participation.3 Sammons defines meaningful
participation as the process by which clients are able to reflect and become
involved in their legal problems. M A lawyer helps the client understand the
options and involves the client in each step of choosing those options, ultimately
allowing the client to be the author of the client's own life. 6 Sammons is
referring to client autonomy.
C Applying the ProfessionalValue ofAutonomy
This Article began with a detailed and systematic account of the meaning
and value of autonomy, revealing its demanding nature. It then demonstrated the
difficulty an attorney faces in trying to advance it. Specifically, there are
conceptual and transactional problems that limit an attorney's ability to enhance
client autonomy. Finally, this Article argued for a deflated role of client
autonomy. Instead of a moral justification, it argued that striving after client
autonomy is a professional responsibility in which each attorney should be
committed. This section illustrates what this means within the context of the
attorney-client relationship. Using the case of Mrs. Jones 366 as an example, this
section explains how an attorney may strive after securing the secondary sense of
autonomy.
William Simon wrote about the struggles he encountered in trying to
advance the autonomy of his client, Mrs. Jones, who faced criminal charges.367
Mrs. Jones was an elderly African American woman who lived in Boston.368
She belonged to a predominately black, lower middle class neighborhood.369
She was charming, liked, and respected in her community, and in sixty-five
years had never had a run-in with the law. 370
She was charged with leaving the scene of a minor traffic accident without
identifying herself.371 A younger white woman, Mrs. Strelski, had complained

361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.

Id.
SAMMONS, supra note 351, at 8.
Id. at 6.
Id at 7.
Id
See Simon, supra note 255, at 214.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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372

to the police who had taken her at her word.
Contrary to the story Mrs.
Strelski told the police, Mrs. Jones insisted that she did remain at the scene to
identify herself. 3 In fact, Mrs. Strelski was the one who sped off without
stopping, and this was after she caused the accident by rear-ending Mrs. Jones.374
Mrs. Jones' version of the story was confirmed by the chipped paint and dents on
each of the women's cars.
The facts seemed to be on Mrs. Jones' side. In addition, the procedure also
favored Mrs. Jones. 37 6 There would first be a bench trial, and even if she lost
that, she was still entitled to have a subsequent jury trial.377 Simon, though,
inexperienced in criminal law, was optimistic about the case and believed that
378
That, of course,
exposing the police's racism would be an effective approach.
was only up until the moment he consulted with his friend, an attorney who was
experienced in traffic offenses.379
Simon's friend immediately dismissed the racism theory and then began a
negotiation with the prosecutor, as was customary in nearly all such cases. 380
Mrs. Jones was offered a plea bargain that, in effect, meant six months'
probation. 38 ' She would have a criminal record, but after a year she could apply
to have it sealed. 382 Refusing the offer exposed her to the chance of having to
endure two separate trials, both of which contained the small, though real,
possibility of losing.383 In the event that both trials were lost, she would lose her
license, pay a fine, and run the risk-albeit a highly unlikely one-of receiving a
8384
4
jail term of up to six months.
Simon counseled Mrs. Jones.
He began by mentioning the pros of
accepting the plea, such as not going to trial, and he ended by spelling out the
cons.386 He concluded their ten minute conversation by expressing that the plea
bargain did not have any practical consequences, but it was not "total justice." 387
After Simon refused to make the decision for her, Mrs. Jones agreed she
wanted justice.3 88 She rejected the offer. 389 Her decision flipped, however, after

372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.

Id.
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id. at 215.
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Simon's friend counseled her.39 0 In opposite order, Simon's friend chose to
discuss the disadvantages of trial last, and he did not end with the opinion that
the plea bargain was not total justice. 391 In the end, Mrs. Jones decided to accept
392
the plea bargain.
Even though both Simon and his friend had the right intentions, it is doubtful
that Mrs. Jones' decision was ultimately autonomous. Simon provides a couple
insights as to why.393 First, he noted that Mrs. Jones initially wanted to defer to
Simon's judgment and expertise.394 She wanted him to make the decision for
her, probably due to a combination of her anxiety and her lack of
understanding. 395 Second, Simon noted that the counselin he and his friend
gave was not neutral, even though they intended it to be.
The points they
chose to explain, and the order in which they presented them, influenced Mrs.
Jones in a manner that precluded her from making a truly autonomous decision.
These insights are consistent with the conceptual and transactional problem.
Conceptually, since making an autonomous decision is an internal achievement,
Mrs. Jones alone was capable of doing it. Simon and his friend could not ensure
an autonomous decision for her. Instead, they could only attempt to secure the
preconditions of autonomy that might put Mrs. Jones in the best situated position
to do so herself. Transactionally, Simon and his friend may have failed to best
secure the appropriate mental ability, independence, and adequate range of
options for Mrs. Jones. An attorney committed to autonomy as a professional
obligation could have made greater efforts to secure each of these.
First, an attorney would strive to secure the appropriate mental ability. Mrs.
Jones was an elderly woman who had never been in trouble with the law.397 She
probably knew very little about the criminal justice system, including presenting
evidence, the presumption of innocence, trials, and plea offers. 39 The only
initiative she took was to bring along her minister who would testify to her good
character.399 In addition, this was the first time she had been charged with a
crime.400 As Simon recalled, the uncertainty and stress of the situation put her in
40
a state of anxiety.401 She felt worried and vulnerable. 402

390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id. at 216-18.
394. Id at 216.
395. Id.
396. Id. at 218.
397. Id. at 214.
398. See id. at 215 ('You're the expert. That's what we come to lawyers for,' [Mrs. Jones and
her minister] said.").
399. Id.
400. Id. at 214.
401. Id. at 216.
402. Id.
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Striving to secure the appropriate mental ability for Mrs. Jones required
explaining the criminal system sufficiently for her to understand what was
involved in going to trial, as opposed to accepting the plea offer. Moreover, it
required that Mrs. Jones be concerned with gaining a sufficient understanding,
that she was a willing and active participant in making the decision. Finally, it
required that the attorney make every effort to calm Mrs. Jones so that her
anxiety did not overwhelm her ability to clearly reflect on the decisions before
her. Doing all of that represents a real commitment to striving after autonomy.
It is apparent that securing the mental ability of Mrs. Jones is both highly
demanding and not necessarily within the attorney's control. An attorney must
understand that, and approach each case with the same willingness despite the
obvious limitations.
Next, an attorney would strive to secure the independence of Mrs. Jones.
Simon and his friend associated Mrs. Jones' independence with her not being
ordered to act one way or the other.403 They assumed that if they presented
information neutrally, devoid of their own opinion as to how she should act, her
decision would be autonomous. 404 However, their counseling was not neutral, as
Mrs. Jones' decision changed based solely upon the order and emphasis of the
information they presented to her. 405
Striving to secure the independence of Mrs. Jones required moving beyond
neutral counseling. It required a dialogue between the attorney and Mrs. Jones,
in which her concerns, values, and perception of the situation were made clear.
The attorney first should have attempted to appreciate from where Mrs. Jones
was coming, and only then presented the information and options that were
available. The attorney must recognize the fiction of neutrality, that their
counseling does not come void of the attorney's own opinions and influence, 406
but also that the attorney's expertise is a necessary com onent that enables the
client to make an independent and informed choice.
If the attorney had
attempted to grasp Mrs. Jones' point of view, and engaged in a dialogue where
she was informed and equipped to make the decision, then the attorney would
have met the professional obligation to strive after securing her independence.
Finally, an attorney would strive after securing an adequate range of options
for Mrs. Jones. Mrs. Jones may or may not have had a sufficient amount of good
options available to her. She may have found both the plea offer and going to
trial inadequate. On the other hand, she may have found both satisfactory,
though that seems highly unlikely. The attorney was required to work closely
with Mrs. Jones to gauge which options she found to be adequate. In fact, the
attorney was required to engage in a dialogue with Mrs. Jones to determine if

403. See id. ("[Mrs. Jones] would have been immensely relieved if I had told her without
explanation what she should have done, and she would have done it.").
404. Id. at 218.
405. Id. at 216.
406. Id. at 217.
407. Id. at 222.
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there were other options that she might have found better. For example,
extending a counteroffer to the prosecutor or proceeding to trial, but on a
different theory than racism. Striving after an adequate range of options is
difficult, especially in criminal cases similar to Mrs. Jones. An attorney
committed to autonomy will realize that, but still attempt to discover or create
potential options for and with the client.
Every attorney has the obligation of attempting to secure the secondary
408
Doing so is part of what it means to be a
sense of autonomy for his clients4.
409
It goes without saying that not all attorneys achieve the
professional.
professional ideal. 4o Rather, it is the identity in which attorneys aspire and the
standard of conduct in which the public expects, the manner in which the public
may judge an attorney's value.4 11 It is important to mention this because, as it
has been demonstrated, an attorney may not be successful in securing the
412
It is a demanding duty that
secondary sense of autonomy for his client.
extends beyond noninterference, and is often outside an attorney's control. The
professional recognizes that the autonomy of the client is an important part of
representation and aspires to best accomplish securing the preconditions
necessary to exercising autonomy. However, the professional also recognizes
there are incredible limitations in trying to do so.
VI. CONCLUSION

The conceptual and transactional problems reveal that attorneys face
considerable limitations in striving after client autonomy. Most attempts to
enhance autonomy will be littered in failure and outside of the attorney's control.
It is for this reason that autonomy serves as a very weak argument for lawyer
amorality, and considering it to be the cornerstone of the attoriey-client
relationship is a mistaken enterprise. Instead, autonomy plays a relatively minor
role.
From this deflated role, autonomy should rather be seen as one of the
commitments of professionalism. Attorneys have a professional obligation to
strive after securing the secondary sense of autonomy for their clients. This
entails a commitment to establishing the mental capacity, independence, and an
adequate range of options for each client. It also entails the understanding that
doing so is difficult, demanding, and not always possible. As a component of
professionalism, client autonomy is one among several commitments an attorney
has. One must remember, however, that there may be cases in which the
attorney is incapable of securing the secondary sense of autonomy for a client.

408.
409.
410.
411.
412.

RAZ, supra note 1, at 372.
Davis, supra note 352, at 162.
See, e.g., Simon, supra note 255, at 214-20 (regarding the story of Mrs. Jones).
SAMMONS, supranote 351, at 5.
See the story of Mrs. Jones supra notes 398-403 and accompanying text.
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